Essays in Microeconomic Theory by Walsh, Alan
University of Cambridge
Essays in Microeconomic Theory
Alan Michael Walsh
Fitzwilliam College
14 February 2020
This thesis is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
This thesis is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome
of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text.
It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently
submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or
any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in
the text. I further state that no substantial part of my thesis has already been submitted,
or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification
at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as
declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It does not exceed the prescribed word
limit for the relevant Degree Committee.
To William B. S. Trimble (1921–2008)

iii
Essays in Microeconomic Theory
Alan Michael Walsh
Abstract
We present a collection of three essays exploring topics in microeconomic theory:
conflict, alliances, and the origins of society; supply chain networks and industrial organ-
isation; and game theory on economic networks.
Chapter 1
Anthropological evidence has shown that humans in the earliest agricultural societies
worked harder and had lesser health outcomes than humans in hunter-gatherer societies.
We develop a model where hunting and gathering is more productive than agriculture, yet
individually rational actors coordinate on a less productive agricultural equilibrium. In
an agricultural society, a group of warriors with dominant fighting skills threaten hunters
into subjugation and tax farmers a portion of their produce. We develop three submodels:
a simple model where all agents are worse off than in a hunter-gatherer society, a model
with inequality where warriors improve their payoff relative to hunting and gathering at
the expense of all other agents, and a dynamic model describing the transition from a
hunter-gatherer society to an agricultural society.
Chapter 2
Barriers to trade can create price discrepancies between markets. We apply this concept to
an intermediation network, where the price at each node varies inversely with the quantity
of resource supplied. We model a directed multipartite graph of intermediaries between
a source and a market, where intermediaries in each partition simultaneously compete in
the manner of Cournot competition, selecting the quantity of resource sold along each of
their out-links. The linking structure represents each intermediary’s opportunity to sell
the resource. We derive an analytical solution determining the quantity decisions of each
intermediary in the network, which we believe is the first such solution for a Cournot-
driven supply chain. We discuss the efficiency of networks, and develop a measure that
evaluates networks according to the consumer surplus received at the market.
iv
Chapter 3
A set of agents is connected by two distinct networks, with each network describing
access to a different local public good. Agents choose in which networks to invest, and
neighbouring agents’ investments in the same good are strategic substitutes, as are an
agent’s two investment choices. There are always equilibria where any investing agent
bears all local investment costs and others free-ride. When investment in one good reduces
marginal benefit from investment in the other, agents free-riding in one good may invest
more profitably in the other, and equilibrium payoffs are more evenly distributed. This
need not reduce aggregate payoff.
JEL Codes: D74, L14, D85
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Chapter 1
Violence and the Neolithic
Revolution
1.1 Introduction
For upwards of 300,000 years, humans relied primarily on hunting and gathering for
survival. Relatively recently, about 10,000 years ago, groups of humans began cultivating
grains for food for the first time, a process termed the ‘Neolithic Revolution’ by Childe
(1936). This was the first step in a series of technological and sociological developments
that led to rapid population growth, urbanisation, and the formation of the advanced
societies that we live in today.
We seek to evaluate the very first steps of agricultural development from an economic
perspective. Why might Neolithic humans, who were thriving as a species, have under-
taken such a significant change in their social structure? We are drawn particularly to the
paradox, first discussed in Lee and DeVore (1968) and later developed by Sahlins (1972)
and Cohen (1989), that the transition to agriculture made life more challenging for Neo-
lithic humans. This has been demonstrated through the archeological study of human
skeletons (Steckel 2004), and is a general consensus amongst anthropologists. Model-
ling Neolithic humans as rational decision makers, we develop a model where a failure
to coordinate may result in self-interested actors choosing agriculture over hunting and
gathering, despite the agricultural outcome ensuring lower utility for all participants.
The model is driven by violence, or the threat of violence, between agents. We as-
sume that hunter-gatherers are do-it-all types, who both produce their own food for
consumption and are responsible for their own protection during violent interactions. An
agricultural society, however, features two types of specialists: farmers who produce food,
and warriors who practise fighting skills and are responsible for the group’s protection.
We assume that warriors, as specialists who devote their entire allotment of time to the
martial arts, have fighting skills that surpass those of hunter-gatherers.
Within an agricultural society, warriors require farmers to produce any food that they
consume, and they are thus incentivised to oversee as many farmers as possible. To
1
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reach this end, warriors will seek out and attack hunter-gatherers who are not under their
purview, driving down their chance of survival. Faced with this threat, hunter-gatherers
will face the choice of continuing to hunt with a greater risk of death, or joining the
agricultural society as farmers, where they would consume less but they will live a full
life. As the fighting superiority of warriors over hunter-gatherers grows, the danger faced
by hunter-gatherers grows, and they are more inclined to choose farming.
We show that our model may produce two types of equilibria. There will always be
a hunter-gatherer equilibrium, where all agents choose to be hunter-gatherers. As well,
there may be an agricultural equilibrium where all agents are either warriors or farmers.
The existence of an agricultural equilibrium depends on the fighting superiority of warriors
over hunter-gatherers, requiring that warriors have a sufficiently large edge in combat. In
keeping with anthropological observations on the welfare of Neolithic humans, we assume
that hunter-gatherers will always produce food more efficiently than farmers. Under this
assumption, payoffs from the hunter-gatherer equilibrium will exceed payoffs from the
agricultural equilibrium for all players.
To explore how society may have transitioned to agricultural equilibria, we develop an
extension where warriors have more control over the equilibrium parameters. We make the
technology of violence exclusive, meaning that neither farmers nor hunter-gatherers may
transition to the warrior class. Then, the warriors face an optimisation problem, having
control over the size of their group and the manner in which food is shared between farmers
and themselves. With this additional control, the warriors form a smaller, more exclusive
group, and exploit the farmers for a disproportionate share of resources. While aggregate
utility in the resulting equilibrium is always lesser than in a hunter-gatherer equilibrium,
under some parameterisations the warriors will achieve greater utility than they would as
hunter-gatherers in the hunter-gatherer equilibrium. Thus, we may postulate a sequence
of events that would have allowed the Neolithic Revolution to occur. Once a small group
of warriors developed a technological ability to exert violent domination over others, they
may have carried out a regime of violence to ensure such a transition took place.
There is little economic research exploring specifically the economic conditions in place
prior to the Neolithic Revolution that may have led to the transition. Smith (1975)
suggests that excessive hunting, particularly of large, easy-to-kill mammals, may have
driven down the the marginal benefit from hunting to the point where it lay below that of
farming. Similarly, North and Thomas (1977) focus on early property rights, arguing that
the stock of animals available to hunt was common property for all with access and rife
for exploitation and overuse. Agriculture, by contrast, featured private property rights,
incentivising early farmers to extract food from their land at sustainable levels. Locay
(1989) argues that the sedentary aspects of agriculture, as opposed to hunting which is
more nomadic, may have increased parents’ ability to rear healthy offspring in the face
of increasing population pressures. Olsson and Hibbs (2005) hypothesise that changes in
environmental conditions led to the transition to agriculture, and that local variations in
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environmental factors explain why different societies transitioned at different times. In the
existing economic literature, economic factors—either endogenous in the cases of Smith,
North and Thomas, and Locay, or exogenous in the case of Olsson and Hibbs—reduce
the marginal benefit from hunting below that of farming. By contrast, in our model
the activity of hunting and gathering always produces food in greater abundance than
farming, but conflict between agents causes agents to settle into an agricultural outcome.
Weisdorf (2005) provides a survey of the existing economic literature in this area.
A broader economic literature exists evaluating the consequences of the Neolithic
Revolution on the institutions and social structures that later developed. Our model
complements this work, providing a potential explanation for the first steps in this process.
Galor and Moav (2002) introduce an economic growth model that attempts to capture all
growth experienced since the Neolithic Revolution. Galor and Moav (2007) expand upon
this theory, empirically linking variations in life expectancy in human populations to the
time elapsed since the transition to agriculture. Similarly, Putterman (2008) links the
timing of the Neolithic Revolution to incomes in the current day. Mayshar et al. (2011)
argue that the transition to agriculture introduced the technology of taxation, which led
to the development of more sophisticated government institutions.
The anthropological perspective on the origins of the Neolithic Revolution is too broad
to fully survey here, but we provide a brief overview. There are two main schools in this
literature. The first school holds that early humans responded to opportunity, where
an event occurs that increases the yield from agriculture. The second school holds that
the Neolithic transition was driven by necessity, where an event occurs that decreases
the yield from hunting and gathering. Both theories converge on the requirement that
agricultural yields must have exceeded the yields from hunting and gathering, but this
premise has been contested by scholars such as Cohen (1989), Cohen and Armelagos
(1984), Lee and DeVore (1968), Sahlins (1972) and Steckel (2004). Popular accounts of
human development from the Neolithic Revolution through to the present day include
Diamond (1997), Fernandez-Armesto (2001), Harari (2014) and Scott (2017).
Our model intersects with economic work on the study of conflict, and the tradeoff
between productive and combative activities. Agents choose between hunting and gath-
ering, which offers a high return but no protection, farming, with a lower return but the
promise of protection, or fighting, which discourages hunter-gatherers, protects farmers,
but has no productive return. This choice is similar to that faced by the participants
in Hirshleifer’s (1995) anarchic society, where participants must find a balance between
productive or fighting effort. Grossman and Kim (1995) build a similar model, adding
the distinction between appropriative and defensive activities. The relationship between
conflict and equality in a society is developed by Esteban and Ray (1999). The extension
of our model offers a binary exposition of this relationship: the hunter-gatherer equilib-
rium is perfectly egalitarian, while the warrior dominated agricultural society features a
wealthy warrior elite and a poorer subclass of farmers. In these models conflict is in-
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troduced through a Tullock contest (Tullock 1980), a means of apportioning the spoils
from any conflict. Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) summarises the economics of conflict
literature and describes the use of Tullock contests. By contrast, in our model conflict is
a winner-take-all contest that is always won by the more dominant party.
In work that is thematically similar to our contribution, Bo´ et al. (2019) explore how
conflict helped encourage the development of civilisation in the Neolithic Era. However,
their model begins with the assumption that environmental factors allow select societies to
obtain a greater yield from agriculture than from hunting and gathering. These societies
then invest in fighting technologies, in a similar manner to Grossman and Kim (1995),
in order to prevent other societies from stealing their excess agricultural production. In
contrast, our model explores how violence may allow agricultural societies to form when
agricultural yields do not exceed the yield from hunting and gathering.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 introduces the basic model. Section 1.3
analyses equilibrium and compares aggregate welfare across different equilibria. Sec-
tion 1.4 introduces an amendment to the model with restricted entry to the warrior class.
In addition, we discuss how the amended game allows for a dynamic transition from a
hunter-gatherer equilibrium to an agricultural equilibrium. Section 1.5 analyses com-
parative statics, focussing on the technology of violence available to the warrior types.
Section 1.6 discusses how our model relates to previous economic literature on the Neo-
lithic Revolution. Section 1.7 concludes. All proofs are presented in Appendix A.1.
1.2 Model
There is a unit continuum of agents, with each agent belonging to exactly one of three
types, Θ = {θh, θf , θw}. We use A to denote the set of agents. The state of the economy
is described by the vector µ = (µh, µf , µw), where µi is the mass of agents of type θi. As
each agent is exactly one type, the set of states is equivalent to ∆2, the standard 2-simplex
in R3. We denote the set of agents of type θi, for i ∈ {h, f, w}, as Ai.
Each type represents an actor in a Neolithic economy. These are
Hunter-gatherers (θh): Hunter-gatherers subsist by hunting animals and gathering
naturally occurring food. The return from this action is v ∈ R+. Hunter-gatherers
may be threatened by warriors, and their probability of survival is
(
1− φ(µw)
)
.
If a hunter-gatherer does not survive, we assume they receive zero utility. The
expected utility of each hunter-gatherer is
uh(µ) = v
(
1− φ(µw)
)
. (1.1)
Farmers (θf): Farmers subsist by planting and cultivating crops. The return from this
action is ` ∈ R+. In addition, each farmer must pay the warriors a tax of t. The
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utility of each farmer is
uf (µ) = `− t. (1.2)
Warriors (θw): Warriors subsist on the taxes they receive from farmers. Warriors also
use their fighting skill to threaten hunter-gatherers, which reduces the survival rate
for hunter-gatherers and encourages them to convert to farming. The total tax
revenue received from all farmers is distributed evenly between all warriors. The
utility of each warrior is
uw(µ) = t
µf
µw
. (1.3)
The tax, t ∈ [0, `], determines how the returns from farming are shared between type-θf
and type-θw agents. As t increases, the size of transfer per type-θf agent increases. This
will increase uw(µ) while decreasing uf (µ).
The technology of violence, φ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], measures how effectively type-θw agents
threaten the survival of type-θh agents. The function φ is continuous and increasing, with
φ(0) = 0 and φ(1) = 1. φ(µw) is the likelihood that a type-θh agent will not survive, given
there is a mass of µw type-θw agents in the population.
All agents are expected-utility maximisers; that is, if ui(µ) > uj(µ), for i, j ∈ {h, f, w},
then agents will prefer choosing type θi over type θj. If ui(µ) = uj(µ), then agents will
be indifferent between choosing types θi and θj.
Anthropological studies suggest that humans in the earliest agricultural societies ex-
perienced lesser health outcomes relative to the outcomes experienced by humans in
hunter-gatherer societies. For this reason, the following assumption is made through-
out.
Assumption 1.1. v > `.
Assumption 1.1 implies that, in the absence of a threat from type-θw agents, uh(µ)
is always greater than uf (µ), and an individual agent will always prefer hunting and
gathering over farming.
1.3 Equilibrium
In this section, we consider the situation where any agent i ∈ A may freely choose his
type θi ∈ {θh, θf , θw}. An equilibrium is defined by the vector µ where no agent would
prefer to be of a different type.
Definition 1.1. The vector µ describes an equilibrium if and only if the following condi-
tion is met:
µi > 0 =⇒ ui(µ) ≥ uj(µ) ∀ i, j ∈ {h, f, w}. (1.4)
We define three potential types of equilibria: hunter-gatherer equilibria, where
µ = (1, 0, 0), agricultural equilibria, where µ = (0, x, 1− x), for x ∈ [0, 1], and mixed
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equilibria, where µi > 0 for all i ∈ {h, f, w}. We begin by claiming that there always
exists a hunter-gatherer equilibrium.
Proposition 1.1. For all v, `, t and φ(·), there exists a hunter-gatherer equilibrium.
Proposition 1.1 is congruent with the observation that when humans first formed ag-
ricultural societies their health outcomes decreased. However, our interest lies in whether
other equilibria may exist, which would have allowed the Neolithic Revolution to occur.
In the proof of Proposition 1.1, we show that if either µw = 0 or µf = 0, then agents
of type θh will achieve the strictly greatest utility. Thus, the existence of an agricultural
society requires the presence of both type-θw agents and type-θf agents working in unison.
The warriors are required to drive down the utility of hunter-gatherers, while the farmers
are the producers of agricultural output. Warriors’ consumption is provided by the farmers
through the tax t.
For any equilibrium to include a mix of types θw and θf , the two types must have the
same utility. That is,
uw(µ) = uf (µ) (1.5)
t
µf
µw
= `− t (1.6)
µw
µf
=
t
`− t . (1.7)
In an agricultural equilibrium there are no type-θh agents, therefore µh = 0. Then, in
any agricultural equilibrium, µf = 1− µw. Substituting this equation into Equation (1.7)
yields
µw
1− µw =
t
`− t (1.8)
µw =
t
`
, (1.9)
and
µf = 1− t
`
(1.10)
µf =
`− t
`
. (1.11)
The existence of an agricultural equilibrium will also require that the utility of type-θh
agents is less than that of the other two types, implying
uf (µ) ≥ uh(µ) (1.12)
`− t ≥ v(1− φ(µw)) (1.13)
vφ(µw)− t ≥ v − `. (1.14)
We summarise this discussion as follows.
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Figure 1.1: For v = 1 and φ(µw) = (µw)
1
2 , the shaded region depicts the (`, t) pairs for
which an agricultural equilibrium exists
Proposition 1.2. Given v, `, and φ(·), an agricultural equilibrium exists if and only if
there exists t ∈ [0, `] such that
vφ
(
t
`
)
− t ≥ v − `. (1.15)
µ =
(
0, `−t
`
, t
`
)
is an equilibrium for all t ∈ [0, `] satisfying Equation (1.15).
The RHS of Equation (1.15) measures the premium that type-θh agents receive from
hunting and gathering compared to the value that type-θf agents receive from farming.
The LHS is the difference between the cost that type-θw agents inflict on type-θf agents,
vφ
(
t
`
)
, and the price paid by type-θf agents to support type-θw agents, t. The existence of
equilibrium is dependent on the technology of violence, and there will be some functions
φ for which no set of parameters will allow for an agricultural equilibrium. For instance,
Figure 1.1 shows the set of parameter values on which the function φ(µw) = (µw)
1
2 permits
an agricultural equilibrium, but the function φ(µw) = µw will not permit an equilibrium
for any set of parameter values.
In addition, some parameter values may permit all three types to co-exist simultan-
eously. For a mixed equilibrium to occur, it must be the case that all types receive the
same expected utility, implying that Equation (1.7) is true and Constraint (1.14) holds
with equality.
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1.3.1 Efficiency
We measure the efficiency of the economy according to the aggregate utility, defined
U(µ) =
∫
i∈A uidi. This is
U(µ) =
∫
i∈A
uidi (1.16)
= µhv
(
1− φ(µw)
)
+ µf (`− t) + µwt µf
µw
(1.17)
= µhv + µf`− vµhφ(µw). (1.18)
The first two terms of Equation (1.18) measure the productive output of the economy,
where all production is carried out by type-θh and type-θf agents. The final term measures
the cost of violence between hunter-gatherers and warriors, a cost which is increasing in
both µh and µw.
Assumption 1.1 guarantees the following proposition.
Proposition 1.3. The hunter-gatherer equilibrium maximises aggregate utility.
The proof is straightforward. Given Assumption 1.1, the vector µ = (1, 0, 0) maximises
U(µ), as given in Equation (1.18).
For any fixed parameterisation of v, `, and φ(·), the agricultural equilibrium that
obtains the greatest aggregate utility is the equilibrium that minimises t. From Equa-
tion (1.18), in any agricultural equlibrium U(µ) = µf`. Then, aggregate utility is in-
creasing in µf , which from Equation (1.11) is µf =
`−t
`
. Thus, a minimal value of t will
maximise µf , in turn maximising U(µ).
As the tax t decreases, farmers keep a greater share of their yield, and they are more
content with farming versus hunting and gathering. Then, fewer warriors are required to
sufficiently threaten hunter-gatherers to entice them to farm. This results in a greater
share of farmers relative to warriors, and the total yield shared between farmers and
warriors is higher. In Figure 1.1, the agricultural equilibrium that maximises aggregate
utility for each ` lies on the bottom boundary of the equilibrium region described by the
curve t = (v−`)
2
`
.
1.4 Warrior Elite
While we have demonstrated the potential for an agricultural equilibrium to exist through
Proposition 1.2, Proposition 1.3 ensures that such an equilibrium would never be preferred
over a hunter-gatherer equilibrium by any of the agents in A. Thus, an agricultural equi-
librium represents a coordination failure for these agents. Given that, prior to transition,
Neolithic societies were in a hunter-gatherer equilibrium, we intend to develop a potential
shock that may have caused rational agents to depart from such an equilibrium.
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We propose to amend the model by making the technology of violence, φ, an exclusive
technology. That is, agents of type θf and θh will not have the ability to transition to
type θw. Suppose, for instance, that a small group of individuals amass sufficient tools or
weaponry to allow them dominance over the hunter-gatherers and farmers that surround
them. Being in possession of the means of violence, this elite group of warriors would
have the ability to restrict access to those whom they select. They would, in effect, have
first mover advantage, as any attempts by non-warriors to stockpile arms independently
would result in a swift violent rebuttal.
We define the warrior elite game as follows:
Stage 1: A single agent, e ∈ A, has access to the technology of violence. Agent e may
choose to be type θw, in which case he will choose a mass of allies, µw ∈ (0, 1], and
the tax, t. Agent e will select the pair (µw, t) that maximises his utility after Stage 2.
Alternatively, e may choose to be type θh, in which case we set µw = 0 and t = 0.
Stage 2: The non-type-θw agents, representing a mass of 1− µw in A, choose their type
from the set {θh, θf}. If they are indifferent between types, they will choose type θf .
We solve the warrior elite game through backward induction. Let the set of non-
type-θw agents be A−w = A \ Aw. Any agent i ∈ A−w who chooses θh will receive payoff
uh(µ) = v
(
1− φ(µw)
)
. Alternatively, any i ∈ A−w who chooses θf will receive payoff
uf (µ) = `− t. Then, Constraint (1.14) determines whether θh or θf generates a greater
payoff for any i ∈ A−w. We summarise the decision rule for any i ∈ A−w as follows:
θi =
θh, if vφ(µw)− t < v − `, andθf , otherwise. (1.19)
After Stage 2, if the agents in A−w choose θh, then uw(µ) will be zero. Thus, e may
only derive positive utility when the agents in A−w choose θf . Agent e’s utility in this
case is
uw(µ) = t
µf
µw
(1.20)
= t
1− µw
µw
. (1.21)
We may then solve for agent e’s optimal choice of (µw, t) in Stage 1, using the following
optimisation problem:
(
µ˜w, t˜
)
= arg max
µw, t
t
1− µw
µw
subject to vφ(µw)− t ≥ v − `.
(1.22)
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If agent e’s payoff from choosing
(
µ˜w, t˜
)
is greater than v, then e will choose to be type θw
and initiate an agricultural equilibrium. Otherwise, e will choose to be type θh and there
will be a hunter-gatherer equilibrium. Agent e’s decision rule is as follows:
θe =

θw, if t˜
1− µ˜w
µ˜w
> v, and
θh, otherwise.
(1.23)
Under the warrior elite game, the proof of Proposition 1.3 still holds: the hunter-
gatherer equilibrium is always the efficient equilibrium. In contrast to our basic model,
however, under the warrior elite game the yield from agriculture is not shared evenly
among all participants in the agricultural society. Because of their fighting dominance, the
type-θw agents may claim a disproportionate share of the agricultural yield for themselves.
As long as the elite group of warriors can ensure themselves a distribution of the yield
that exceeds their utility from hunting and gathering, they will force the entire society
into an equilibrium that is worse for society from an aggregate utility standpoint.
The optimal choice of µw, which determines whether a warrior elite may form, is
affected by two factors. As µw increases, the threat to type-θh agents rises, meaning that
hunting and gathering becomes less rewarding relative to farming. This, in turn, allows e
to raise t while still ensuring that any agent i ∈ A−w will choose farming, and the larger
value of t will increase the amount of food shared amongst the type-θw agents. However,
because the type-θw agents share their allotment of food equally, as µw increases each
individual type-θw agent will receive a smaller portion of the agricultural yield.
In Section 1.5.2 we will examine in more detail the technologies of violence that allow
e to profitably establish a warrior elite.
1.4.1 Dynamic Transition
The warrior elite game is presented as a static game; however, it may easily be contextu-
alised as a dynamic game to describe a transition from a hunter-gatherer equilibrium to
an agricultural equilibrium. Suppose that, once a warrior elite forms, the transition to an
agricultural equilibrium is not instantaneous. Instead, we suppose that, once the warrior
elite is established, type-θh agents transition to type θf at a rate proportional to the mass
of type-θh agents.
Suppose that there exists an agricultural equilibrium in the static warrior elite game.
Consider an intertemporal process where τ denotes the time elapsed from an initial start-
ing point. Let hτ , fτ , and wτ be the masses of types-θh, θf , and θw agents, respectively,
at times τ ≥ 0. At time τ = 0, assume that e has the option to form a warrior elite of
size µ∗w, where (µ
∗
w, t
∗) is the solution to Equation (1.22). We assume that the size of the
warrior elite remains constant once it forms, and so wτ = µ
∗
w for all τ ≥ 0.
At time τ = 0, if a warrior elite forms then the state vector is µ0 = (1− µ∗w, 0, µ∗w).
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Assume that type-θh agents will transition to type θf at a rate of
dhτ = −λhτdτ, (1.24)
where λ ∈ (0, 1). This would imply that the rate at which type-θf agents appear is
dfτ = λhτdτ (1.25)
= λ(1− µ∗w − fτ ) dτ. (1.26)
Equations (1.24) and (1.26) define the state vector µτ for all τ ≥ 0.
Assume that agent e discounts his future utility at a continuous discount factor
δ ∈ [0, 1]. Then e’s discounted lifetime utility, starting at time τ = 0, is
Ue =
∞∫
0
ue(µτ ) e
−δτdτ. (1.27)
At time τ = 0, e will choose between creating a warrior elite or maintaining the status
quo by remaining in a hunter-gatherer equilibrium. Agent e will choose to form a warrior
elite if his discounted lifetime utility is greater under this path.
Define µµ∗w = (0, 1− µ∗w, µ∗w). We propose the following.
Proposition 1.4. For all δ ∈ [0, 1], if
λ >
δ2v
uw
(
µµ∗w
)− δv , (1.28)
then agent e will create a warrior elite. Otherwise agent e will maintain the status quo.
Proposition 1.4 shows that, so long as there is an agricultural equilibrium in the warrior
elite game, there are parameterisations of the dynamic transition that would entice e to
form a warrior elite.
1.5 Comparative Statics
A key element of both of the models presented in this chapter that drives the feasibility
of an agricultural equilibrium is φ, the technology of violence. The function φ measures
how effectively a group of warriors can threaten and subjugate hunter-gatherers, driving
down their survival probabilities and causing them to choose farming. As warriors get
more efficient, a smaller group will be required, allowing more agents to work as farmers,
increasing the total agricultural yield.
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1.5.1 Base Model
In the base model, the technology of violence determines whether an agricultural equilib-
rium exists.
Proposition 1.5. Fix parameters v and `.
1. Suppose that technology of violence φg permits an agricultural equilibrium. Then, for
any φ` such that φ`(x) ≥ φg(x) ∀ x ∈ [0, 1], φ` permits an agricultural equilibrium.
2. Suppose that technology of violence φg does not permit an agricultural equilibrium.
Then, for any φ` such that φ`(x) ≤ φg(x) ∀ x ∈ [0, 1], φ` will not permit an agricul-
tural equilibrium.
Proposition 1.5 describes how we may classify technologies of violence according to a
partial ordering, and how we may use this ordering to determine equilibrium existence.
The first part of the proposition stipulates that, given a technology of violence φf that
permits an agricultural equilibrium, any technology of violence that is at least as effective
for all µw will also permit an agricultural equilibrium. The second part of the proposition
states the reverse: given a technology of violence that does not permit an agricultural
equilibrium, any technology of violence that is weakly less effective for all µw will also not
permit an agricultural equilibrium.
Example 1.1. As an example, consider the family of power functions φ(x) = xy for some
y ∈ R+. As a consequence of Proposition 1.5, we may construct well-defined intervals for
which φ(x) will and will not permit an agricultural equilibrium, as long as there is at least
one power function that does permit an agricultural equilibrium.
Suppose there exists some y ∈ R+ for which φ(x) = xy permits an equilibrium. Then,
set
L = lim sup
y∈R+
, such that φ(x) = xy permits an equilbrium, and (1.29)
U = lim inf
y∈R+
, such that φ(x) = xy does not permit an equilbrium. (1.30)
Then, for all a, b ∈ R+ such that a < L ≤ U < b, φ(x) = xa permits an agricultural equi-
librium, and φ(x) = xb does not permit an agricultural equilibrium.
1.5.2 Warrior Elite
In the warrior elite game, an agricultural equilibrium will occur if there is a (µw, t) pair
that yields uw(µ) > v. A type-θw agent’s utility in this game is highly dependent on φ,
particularly on the steepness of φ on small values. Recall that each type-θw agent’s share
of the tax revenue is t1−µw
µw
. Thus, as µw decreases, each agent’s share will increase in two
ways: the numerator increases as the number of type-θf agents grows, increasing yield,
and the denominator shrinks as there are fewer type-θw agents to share the revenue.
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Figure 1.2: Type-θw utility for different φ. v = 1, ` = 0.7
Figure 1.2 shows φ as a family of decreasing power functions. Each curve presents
the utility of an individual type-θw agent, given the warrior elite is of mass µw. The tax,
t, is computed implicitly to maximise φ(µw). The peak of each curve occurs where the
mass of the warrior elite maximises individual utilty for type-θw agents, which is the value
for µw that agent e would select. For the first two curves, φ(x) = x and φ(x) = x
1
2 , the
maximum value for uw
(
µµw
)
is less than v. Agent e cannot profitably deviate from the
hunter-gatherer equilibrium to form a warrior elite, as his utility post-deviation would
fall.
Under the third curve, φ(x) = x
1
3 , a group of type-θw agents is more efficient at threat-
ening type-θh agents than a group of the same mass would be under the first two curves.
A relatively smaller group is able to sufficiently threaten the type-θh agents, resulting
in a higher ratio of type-θf agents to type-θw agents. The peak of this curve is above
v = 1, in Figure 1.2, which shows the level where agent e may profitably deviate from the
hunter-gatherer equilibrium to form a warrior elite. Finally, the curve φ(x) = x
1
4 shows
that as the φ function increases in efficiency, a warrior elite that is decreasing in size may
obtain increasingly greater utility.
1.6 Discussion
In this section, we contrast our model with the previous economic literature on the Neo-
lithic Revolution. We draw predominantly from Weisdorf (2005), who summarises this
literature into the general model reproduced in Figure 1.3.
At the time of the Neolithic Revolution, human societies choose between two forms
of production: hunting and gathering, or agriculture. Agriculture provides a constant
marginal productivity to each agent, whereas the marginal productivity from hunting and
gathering declines with the size of the labour force. Prior to the Neolithic Revolution,
relatively few human societies faced any forms of population pressure, and thus we assume
the size of the labour force was at point L1. Rational agents would choose hunting and
gathering as a means of production.
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Figure 1.3: The standardized model (Weisdorf 2005, Figure 1)
this model. It illustrates the relationship between the size of the labour force and
the marginal product of labour in food provision.
The figure can be divided along the labour force axis into three areas. First,
when the size of the labour force is below L2, human effort is devoted exclusively
to foraging, because, here, the marginal product of labour in foraging exceeds
that of farming. Second, for sufficiently low levels of labour, i.e. when the size of
the labour force is below L0, marginal labour productivity in foraging is constant
and equals the average labour productivity. The latter property is valid only as
long as there is empty land that surplus labour can migrate to.9 Third, when the
size of the labour force is between L0 and L2, additional labour, running up
against the land constraint, is subject to diminishing returns. Finally, note that
once the size of the labour force surpasses L2, any additional labour will enter
agriculture. Any growth in the labour force will therefore increase the share of
labour engaged in farming. Note also that farming exhibits constant returns to
labour, a fair assumption given the abundance of suitable land at that time.10
Consider any point along the labour force axis where the size of the labour
force falls between 0 and L2. Here, the entire labour force is devoted to foraging
activities. Assume for the sake of argument that we start with a situation where
the labour force has a size of L1 (L0, L2). From here, three changes can account
for the transition to agriculture: (i) declining marginal product of labour from
foraging, corresponding to downward shift of the MPHG-curve (Figure 2); (ii) an
advance in the marginal product of labour in farming, expressed as the MPA-
curve shifting upwards (Figure 3) and (iii) growth in the labour force (Figure 4).
In each of the three cases, the economy enters a regime of mixed activities.11
With this representation in mind, recall Childe (1935) oasis hypothesis, where
desiccation decreases the stock of wild foods. This shifts the MPHG-curve down-
ward as illustrated in Figure 2. The theories of Darwin (1868), Sauer (1952),
Braidwood and Howe (1960), Harris (1989) and Rindos (1984), suggest that as
humans became better acquainted with their later domesticates (Childe actually
also proposed this), translate here to an upward shift in the MPA-curve as
L0
Labour 
productivity
L1 L2
MPHG
MPA
Labour
force
Figure 1. The Standardized Model.
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Figure 1.4: Non-warrior utility as a function of the mass of warriors
Generally, existing economic models postulate some form of shock to the forces at
play in Figure 1.3. For instance, Smith (1975) hypothesises that overhunting led to a
decline in the marginal productivity from hunting and gathering. This would be reflected
in sufficiently large downward shift in the MPHG curve such that, at the point L1, MPA
exceeds MPHG. Alternatively, Locay (1989) suggests that population growth may have
preceded the Neolithic Revolution. A shock to the labour force to a level to the right of
L0 would sufficiently drive down the marginal productivity from hunting and gathering
to make agricultural production a rational decision.
By contrast, Assumption 1.1 stipulates that in our model marginal productivity from
hunting and gathering always exceeds the marginal productivity from agriculture in our
model, as represented by the horizontal lines at v and `− t in Figure 1.4. However, the
technology of violence imposes a cost on all hunter-gatherers, which is a function of the
mass of warriors in society, and the hunters’ utility is the sum of their productive output
less the cost of violence. While marginal productivity is constant, marginal utility for
non-warriors is decreasing as the number of type-θw agents grows, as described by the line
labeled v
(
1− φ(µw)
)
. When µw is less than the threshold µ
′
w, a rational non-warrior will
choose hunting and gathering. If µw is greater than µ
′
w, then the threat of violence will
be sufficient to cause non-warriors to choose agriculture.
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1.7 Conclusion
We have contributed a new mechanism with which to interpret and potentially explain
the Neolithic Revolution. While the anthropological literature on this period is expansive
and increasing, there are relatively few economic contributions, exploring specifically the
reward structures in place for humans during this period and the strategic incentives
for humans to give up their hunting and gathering lifestyles in exchange for agricultural
lifestyles.
In our model, hunting and gathering always provides a greater yield than agriculture.
However, agents may specialise in violence, which allows them to threaten the survival
of other agents. Agents who specialise in violence form a class of warriors, who threaten
any agents who choose hunting and gathering as their activity. This threat reduces the
expected utility from hunting and gathering, which may lead agents to select farming as
an activity instead. The farmers then share the food they produce with the warriors.
When an agricultural equilibrium exists, it will always result in a lower utility for all
participants than a hunting and gathering equilibrium would.
We develop an additional restriction, where warriors form an elite group that all other
agents are restricted from entering. This restriction allows for considerable inequality
in the agricultural outcome, with the warriors receiving a greater share of production
per agent than the farmers. While aggregate utility remains lower in an agricultural
equilibrium compared with a hunter-gatherer equilibrium, the warrior elite will achieve
utilities that are greater in an agricultural equilibrium, at the expense of farmers whose
utilities are lesser. Thus, the warrior elite would have incentive to trigger a transition to
an agricultural equilibrium from a starting point of a hunter-gatherer equilibrium. We
model this as a static game, and also describe a dynamic process through which the
transition may occur.

Chapter 2
Cournot Supply Chains
2.1 Introduction
Following a large catch, a fishing-boat captain may face an interesting consideration.
Selling the entire catch to a single distributor could depress the price that the distributor
is willing to pay, as he may not have a sufficiently large set of buyers to offload the supply
to. Alternatively, the captain may choose to sell parts of the catch to multiple distribut-
ors, where each distributor would potentially pay a greater price per unit (Jensen 2007,
provides evidence that fishermen will engage in this sort of behaviour). The distributors
would then face a similar consideration when allocating the fish to their own buyers, to
sell the fish in a single market or distribute the goods more widely. We replicate this
phenomenon in a network setting, where the price that any buyer is willing to pay is a
function of the quantity that they receive; sellers must refrain from overwhelming their
buyers with supply, while simultaneously competing for market share against other sellers.
In the preponderance of economic intermediation models, intermediaries compete in
prices. In such models, goods tend to flow as a single mass, with all goods selecting the
cheapest path and small price fluctuations potentially causing large shifts in equilibria to
new paths. These dynamics would not describe the small-scale fisheries industry, and we
believe that a new model is warranted. For many resources, local prices may vary wildly
according to the current supply, and a quantity-driven model may provide insight into a
variety of commodity markets.
An historical example is the earliest oil markets in Western Pennsylvania beginning
in the late 1850s (Tarbell 1904). There was a clear chain from source to market: first the
drillers sold their oil to teamsters, who would sell their oil to refiners, who finally sold their
oil to shippers in New York, who would send the oil overseas. The Standard Oil Company
attained significant market power by consolidating all of the refiners, thus reducing the
refining step to a single entity. The drillers remained in near perfect competition, and
collectively they oversupplied raw oil to such an extent that Standard Oil was able to
purchase their entire demanded quantity of oil at very low prices. In fact, at times
oversupply was so extreme that drillers were forced to pump their excess oil back into the
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ground.
We assume that there is a single source of a resource, and a single market that demands
this good. Between these lie a multipartite network of intermediaries, each extracting rent
from buying the good and then selling the good at higher prices to intermediaries nearer
to the market. In each tier, intermediaries must simultaneously decide how to allocate
their quantity of resource to all of the buyers to whom they have connections. As profit
maximisers, intermediaries seek to sell their quantity of the good at the highest possible
price. However, the price a buyer will pay is determined by the joint demand function of
all buyers in a tier. The price paid for the good by any intermediary decreases as their
allocation of the good increases. The demand function is recursive, being determined by
the revenues that the intermediaries will obtain when they sell the good to intermediaries
in the next tier.
When two selling intermediaries are linked to the same buyer, their allocation decisions
with respect to that buyer are substitutes. An increase in the quantity of the good
provided from one seller to the buyer will increase the buyer’s price, and thus reduce the
marginal benefit that the other seller receives.
Our primary contribution is to develop a full analytical solution to the model. As
the network is multipartite, the flow of the good can be broken down into a discrete
series of steps between each pair of connected tiers in the network. Beginning at the
final tier, intermediaries sell all of their good to the market, and marginal revenue is
determined in the manner of standard Cournot competition, driven by the quantity that
each intermediary has available to sell. When the intermediaries in the final tier buy the
good from the second-from-last tier, the final tier intermediaries will pay a price equal
to their marginal revenue per unit of the good received. This creates a demand schedule
for the intermediaries in the second-from-last tier, who jointly allocate the good to their
buyers in a manner that maximises their individual revenues. The marginal revenues
received by each intermediary in the second-from-last tier create the demand schedule
used by intermediaries in the third-from-last tier. Recursing through the network, we
determine the optimal quantities that each intermediary in the initial tier will obtain
from the source, which determines the flow of good through the entire network.
When buying the good, each intermediary functions locally as a market with an oligo-
poly of sellers, with each connected seller engaging in a Cournot competition. Each seller
is differentiated by their set of out-links, which allows them to select in which markets
(buyers) to participate. In each market, the sellers are price setters, with their choice of
quantity affecting the market price. As such, the profit maximising decision for any seller
maximises marginal revenue, not price. We examine the local decision making processes
within each tier, and develop an approximation to determine the amount of the good that
will be allocated to any new link.
Using the analytical solution, we determine the networks that generate the least and
greatest flow of the good to the final market. Using these networks we find closed-form
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bounds on the maximal and minimal quantity of good traded based upon the number of
tiers and the number of intermediaries in each tier in a network. We develop a measure,
the price of incompleteness, that evaluates networks according to the consumer surplus
they generate in comparison to a dense network.
Corbett and Karmarkar (2001) develop a model of quantity competition in a supply
chain. Intermediaries are separated into tiers, and in each tier agents simultaneously
choose quantities that determine the price paid by agents in the next tier. In contrast to
our model, there are no linking structures, as the pool of resource provided by interme-
diaries in one tier is available to all intermediaries in the next tier, and thus all markets
must be complete. Bimpikis, Candogan et al. (2019) look at the resilience of multi-tiered
supply chains under adverse shocks. Like Corbett and Karmarkar, they assume that mar-
kets are complete between each tier. Nagurney et al. (2002) describe a two-step chain
of quantity competition, where manufacturers produce goods for retailers, who then sell
the goods to consumers. Each stage is complete, but links have heterogeneous costs as-
sociated with selling the good. Adida and DeMiguel (2011) describe a single-step supply
chain where a set of manufacturers provide multiple products to a set of retailers with
stochastic demand. They allow for asymmetries in demand, which lead to heterogeneous
product provision. Owing to the complexity of their models, both Adida and DeMiguel
(2011) and Nagurney et al. (2002) use numerical methods to approximate equilibrium.
Alternatively, we develop an analytical solution to our model, which provides greater
scope for analysis.
Manea (2018) analyses a directed acyclic network of intermediaries buying and re-
selling an indivisible good. Intermediaries bargain over price, and Manea develops an
algorithm for determining which intermediaries hold bargaining power. In Manea (2019),
the good is a duplicable information good that diffuses through an undirected network of
intermediaries. They find a method of partitioning the network into equivalence classes
that determines which intermediaries are essential. Both models demonstrate how the
nature of transactions determines which intermediaries benefit most in a network setting.
Our network is most similar to Manea’s (2018), but we find that when intermediaries
compete in quantities, as opposed to prices, profits and the flow of goods are more evenly
distributed amongst intermediaries.
Two papers draw explicitly upon applications of Cournot competition in networks.
Bimpikis, Ehsani et al. (2019) propose a one-step game, with a tier of firms selling to
a tier of heterogeneous markets. In structure, our game is similar, particularly with
regard to the strategic decision making between competing firms. Our contribution is to
develop a game on a multi-tiered intermediation chain, where decision making is sequential
and intermediaries must consider the actions of others above and below them in the
network. Nava (2015) proposes a model where agents in an undirected network receive
heterogeneous endowments of a good. Then, a series of transfers occurs, where the good
is redistributed between the nodes and the price paid by any node is determined by that
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node’s demand and the total amount of good they receive.
That being central within a network—that is, being an agent who bridges other
agents—brings value in a trading setting is a well-explored concept. In an undirected
network, Choi et al. (2017) propose a model where two agents can trade to create a sur-
plus, and all other agents post the price they would charge to allow trade to flow through
their node. They find that it is essential agents, those who lie on every path between the
traders, that are able to demand an intermediation rent, and they perform laboratory
experiments that confirm human players will employ the expected strategies.
We proceed as follows: Section 2.2 defines a network and outlines the game played by
all intermediaries. Section 2.3 begins with a worked example of equilibrium on a sample
network, before presenting an analytical solution for the unique equilibrium on any net-
work. Section 2.4 analyses the decision-making process for intermediaries in greater depth
and presents an approximation for finding the profit-maximising new out-link for any in-
termediary. Section 2.5 evaluates the effect of varying network structures on consumer
surplus. Section 2.6 concludes. All proofs are found in Appendix B.2.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Network
There are n+ 2 nodes in a directed multipartite network, each representing an individual
or firm. These are a source node, s, a target (or sink) node, t, and n intermediaries in the
set I. The network is arranged into m+ 2 tiers . Tier 0 contains only node t, tier m+ 1
contains only node s, and each intermediary i ∈ I exists in one of tiers {1, . . . ,m}. The
set of nodes in tier x is Ix ⊂ I. A partition of the nodes in i into the sets {I1, . . . , Im} is
denoted P(I).
The nodes in the network are connected by a set of edges, E. Each edge is directed,
connecting a tail in tier x to a head in tier x− 1. The existence of an edge indicates that
the tail may sell goods to the head. The set of edges that runs from tier x to tier x− 1
is Ex,x−1 ⊂ E.
A network g is a collection of the two sets I ∪ s ∪ t and E. We assume that an edge
exists from s to each node in tier m, and from each node in tier 1 to t. The remaining
network is described by the variable gij defined on each ordered pair ij such that i, j ∈ I.
gij = 1 if the edge ei,j exists in g, and gij = 0 if it does not.
For any node i ∈ I, we denote any edge for which i is the head as an in-link , and any
edge for which i is the tail as an out-link . The set of nodes from which i has an in-link is i’s
in-neighbourhood , defined N+i (g) = {j ∈ I ∪ s | gji = 1}. Similarly, i’s out-neighbourhood
is the set N−i (g) = {j ∈ I ∪ t | gij = 1}. We define the sets of i’s in-links and out-links
as L+i (g) = {ji ∈ E | gji = 1} and L−i (g) = {ij ∈ E | gij = 1}, respectively. We define i’s
in-degree and out-degree as d+i =
∣∣N+i (g)∣∣ and d−i = ∣∣N−i (g)∣∣, respectively. The members
of i’s in-neighbourhood may also be referred to as i’s upstream neighbours, and similarly,
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Figure 2.1: A network with n = 8 and m = 3
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<latexit sha1_base64="CTqd h64Nql5gnDNOxn/kfTLeBGY=">AAAB7nicbZC7SgNBFIbPxluMt6 ilIINBiE3YjYh2BmwsEzAXyC5hdjKbDJmdXWZmhbCk9AFsLBSxtb LOc9j5DL6Ek0uhiT8MfPz/Ocw5x485U9q2v6zMyura+kZ2M7e1vb O7l98/aKgokYTWScQj2fKxopwJWtdMc9qKJcWhz2nTH9xM8uY9lY pF4k4PY+qFuCdYwAjWxmq6xVSN3LNOvmCX7KnQMjhzKFx/jGvfD8 fjaif/6XYjkoRUaMKxUm3HjrWXYqkZ4XSUcxNFY0wGuEfbBgUOqf LS6bgjdGqcLgoiaZ7QaOr+7khxqNQw9E1liHVfLWYT87+snejgyk uZiBNNBZl9FCQc6QhNdkddJinRfGgAE8nMrIj0scREmwvlzBGcx ZWXoVEuOeeli5pdqBRhpiwcwQkUwYFLqMAtVKEOBAbwCM/wYsXWk /Vqvc1KM9a85xD+yHr/AXlwk1k=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="CTqd h64Nql5gnDNOxn/kfTLeBGY=">AAAB7nicbZC7SgNBFIbPxluMt6 ilIINBiE3YjYh2BmwsEzAXyC5hdjKbDJmdXWZmhbCk9AFsLBSxtb LOc9j5DL6Ek0uhiT8MfPz/Ocw5x485U9q2v6zMyura+kZ2M7e1vb O7l98/aKgokYTWScQj2fKxopwJWtdMc9qKJcWhz2nTH9xM8uY9lY pF4k4PY+qFuCdYwAjWxmq6xVSN3LNOvmCX7KnQMjhzKFx/jGvfD8 fjaif/6XYjkoRUaMKxUm3HjrWXYqkZ4XSUcxNFY0wGuEfbBgUOqf LS6bgjdGqcLgoiaZ7QaOr+7khxqNQw9E1liHVfLWYT87+snejgyk uZiBNNBZl9FCQc6QhNdkddJinRfGgAE8nMrIj0scREmwvlzBGcx ZWXoVEuOeeli5pdqBRhpiwcwQkUwYFLqMAtVKEOBAbwCM/wYsXWk /Vqvc1KM9a85xD+yHr/AXlwk1k=</latexit>
i31
<latexit sha1_base64="iRvC ZVc5QjDKcKdMiyMzIYkCnx4=">AAAB83icbVC7SgNBFJ2NrxhfUR vBZjAIsQm7BtHOgI1lBPOA7BJmJ7PJkHksM7NCWPY3bCwUsbDxJ /wEO7/ArxCcPApNPHDhcM693HtPGDOqjet+Orml5ZXVtfx6YWNz a3unuLvX1DJRmDSwZFK1Q6QJo4I0DDWMtGNFEA8ZaYXDq7HfuiNK UyluzSgmAUd9QSOKkbGS75dT2k2rXpb5J91iya24E8BF4s1I6fL 7XX4dvPJ6t/jh9yROOBEGM6R1x3NjE6RIGYoZyQp+okmM8BD1Scd SgTjRQTq5OYPHVunBSCpbwsCJ+nsiRVzrEQ9tJ0dmoOe9sfif10 lMdBGkVMSJIQJPF0UJg0bCcQCwRxXBho0sQVhReyvEA6QQNjamg g3Bm395kTRPK161cnbjlmplMEUeHIIjUAYeOAc1cA3qoAEwiME9e ARPTuI8OM/Oy7Q158xm9sEfOG8/MGSVgQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="iRvC ZVc5QjDKcKdMiyMzIYkCnx4=">AAAB83icbVC7SgNBFJ2NrxhfUR vBZjAIsQm7BtHOgI1lBPOA7BJmJ7PJkHksM7NCWPY3bCwUsbDxJ /wEO7/ArxCcPApNPHDhcM693HtPGDOqjet+Orml5ZXVtfx6YWNz a3unuLvX1DJRmDSwZFK1Q6QJo4I0DDWMtGNFEA8ZaYXDq7HfuiNK UyluzSgmAUd9QSOKkbGS75dT2k2rXpb5J91iya24E8BF4s1I6fL 7XX4dvPJ6t/jh9yROOBEGM6R1x3NjE6RIGYoZyQp+okmM8BD1Scd SgTjRQTq5OYPHVunBSCpbwsCJ+nsiRVzrEQ9tJ0dmoOe9sfif10 lMdBGkVMSJIQJPF0UJg0bCcQCwRxXBho0sQVhReyvEA6QQNjamg g3Bm395kTRPK161cnbjlmplMEUeHIIjUAYeOAc1cA3qoAEwiME9e ARPTuI8OM/Oy7Q158xm9sEfOG8/MGSVgQ==</latexit>
i32
<latexit sha1_base64="izbg lGIlYyeYb+Whg8N4ut5Zdc8=">AAAB83icbVC7SgNBFJ31GeMrai PYDAYhNmE3QbQzYGMZwTwgu4TZyWwyZB7LzKwQlv0NGwtFLGz8C T/Bzi/wKwQnj0ITD1w4nHMv994Txoxq47qfztLyyuraem4jv7m1 vbNb2NtvapkoTBpYMqnaIdKEUUEahhpG2rEiiIeMtMLh1dhv3RGl qRS3ZhSTgKO+oBHFyFjJ90sp7abVSpb5p91C0S27E8BF4s1I8fL 7XX4dvvJ6t/Dh9yROOBEGM6R1x3NjE6RIGYoZyfJ+okmM8BD1Scd SgTjRQTq5OYMnVunBSCpbwsCJ+nsiRVzrEQ9tJ0dmoOe9sfif10 lMdBGkVMSJIQJPF0UJg0bCcQCwRxXBho0sQVhReyvEA6QQNjamv A3Bm395kTQrZa9aPrtxi7USmCIHjsAxKAEPnIMauAZ10AAYxOAeP IInJ3EenGfnZdq65MxmDsAfOG8/MeyVgg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="izbg lGIlYyeYb+Whg8N4ut5Zdc8=">AAAB83icbVC7SgNBFJ31GeMrai PYDAYhNmE3QbQzYGMZwTwgu4TZyWwyZB7LzKwQlv0NGwtFLGz8C T/Bzi/wKwQnj0ITD1w4nHMv994Txoxq47qfztLyyuraem4jv7m1 vbNb2NtvapkoTBpYMqnaIdKEUUEahhpG2rEiiIeMtMLh1dhv3RGl qRS3ZhSTgKO+oBHFyFjJ90sp7abVSpb5p91C0S27E8BF4s1I8fL 7XX4dvvJ6t/Dh9yROOBEGM6R1x3NjE6RIGYoZyfJ+okmM8BD1Scd SgTjRQTq5OYMnVunBSCpbwsCJ+nsiRVzrEQ9tJ0dmoOe9sfif10 lMdBGkVMSJIQJPF0UJg0bCcQCwRxXBho0sQVhReyvEA6QQNjamv A3Bm395kTQrZa9aPrtxi7USmCIHjsAxKAEPnIMauAZ10AAYxOAeP IInJ3EenGfnZdq65MxmDsAfOG8/MeyVgg==</latexit>
i22
<latexit sha1_base64="o87/ NM+0Flg1ilazELsMqd17B8E=">AAAB83icbVC7SgNBFJ2NrxhfUR vBZjAIsQm7EdHOgI1lBPOA7BJmJ7PJkHksM7NCWPY3bCwUsbDxJ /wEO7/ArxCcPApNPHDhcM693HtPGDOqjet+Orml5ZXVtfx6YWNza 3unuLvX1DJRmDSwZFK1Q6QJo4I0DDWMtGNFEA8ZaYXDq7HfuiNK UyluzSgmAUd9QSOKkbGS75dT2k2r1SzzT7rFkltxJ4CLxJuR0uX3 u/w6eOX1bvHD70mccCIMZkjrjufGJkiRMhQzkhX8RJMY4SHqk46 lAnGig3RycwaPrdKDkVS2hIET9fdEirjWIx7aTo7MQM97Y/E/r5 OY6CJIqYgTQwSeLooSBo2E4wBgjyqCDRtZgrCi9laIB0ghbGxMBR uCN//yImlWK95p5ezGLdXKYIo8OARHoAw8cA5q4BrUQQNgEIN78 AienMR5cJ6dl2lrzpnN7IM/cN5+ADBjlYE=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="o87/ NM+0Flg1ilazELsMqd17B8E=">AAAB83icbVC7SgNBFJ2NrxhfUR vBZjAIsQm7EdHOgI1lBPOA7BJmJ7PJkHksM7NCWPY3bCwUsbDxJ /wEO7/ArxCcPApNPHDhcM693HtPGDOqjet+Orml5ZXVtfx6YWNza 3unuLvX1DJRmDSwZFK1Q6QJo4I0DDWMtGNFEA8ZaYXDq7HfuiNK UyluzSgmAUd9QSOKkbGS75dT2k2r1SzzT7rFkltxJ4CLxJuR0uX3 u/w6eOX1bvHD70mccCIMZkjrjufGJkiRMhQzkhX8RJMY4SHqk46 lAnGig3RycwaPrdKDkVS2hIET9fdEirjWIx7aTo7MQM97Y/E/r5 OY6CJIqYgTQwSeLooSBo2E4wBgjyqCDRtZgrCi9laIB0ghbGxMBR uCN//yImlWK95p5ezGLdXKYIo8OARHoAw8cA5q4BrUQQNgEIN78 AienMR5cJ6dl2lrzpnN7IM/cN5+ADBjlYE=</latexit>
i21
<latexit sha1_base64="YkY1 Q3UTQg+qZ2gS03m4qfvmLQY=">AAAB83icbVC7SgNBFJ2NrxhfUR vBZjAIsQm7EdHOgI1lBPOA7BJmJ7PJkHksM7NCWPY3bCwUsbDxJ /wEO7/ArxCcPApNPHDhcM693HtPGDOqjet+Orml5ZXVtfx6YWNza 3unuLvX1DJRmDSwZFK1Q6QJo4I0DDWMtGNFEA8ZaYXDq7HfuiNK UyluzSgmAUd9QSOKkbGS75dT2k2rXpb5J91iya24E8BF4s1I6fL7 XX4dvPJ6t/jh9yROOBEGM6R1x3NjE6RIGYoZyQp+okmM8BD1Scd SgTjRQTq5OYPHVunBSCpbwsCJ+nsiRVzrEQ9tJ0dmoOe9sfif10 lMdBGkVMSJIQJPF0UJg0bCcQCwRxXBho0sQVhReyvEA6QQNjamgg 3Bm395kTSrFe+0cnbjlmplMEUeHIIjUAYeOAc1cA3qoAEwiME9e ARPTuI8OM/Oy7Q158xm9sEfOG8/LtuVgA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="YkY1 Q3UTQg+qZ2gS03m4qfvmLQY=">AAAB83icbVC7SgNBFJ2NrxhfUR vBZjAIsQm7EdHOgI1lBPOA7BJmJ7PJkHksM7NCWPY3bCwUsbDxJ /wEO7/ArxCcPApNPHDhcM693HtPGDOqjet+Orml5ZXVtfx6YWNza 3unuLvX1DJRmDSwZFK1Q6QJo4I0DDWMtGNFEA8ZaYXDq7HfuiNK UyluzSgmAUd9QSOKkbGS75dT2k2rXpb5J91iya24E8BF4s1I6fL7 XX4dvPJ6t/jh9yROOBEGM6R1x3NjE6RIGYoZyQp+okmM8BD1Scd SgTjRQTq5OYPHVunBSCpbwsCJ+nsiRVzrEQ9tJ0dmoOe9sfif10 lMdBGkVMSJIQJPF0UJg0bCcQCwRxXBho0sQVhReyvEA6QQNjamgg 3Bm395kTSrFe+0cnbjlmplMEUeHIIjUAYeOAc1cA3qoAEwiME9e ARPTuI8OM/Oy7Q158xm9sEfOG8/LtuVgA==</latexit>
i23
<latexit sha1_base64="o2t6 X/NZCO6iivSsGltp/0PuioY=">AAAB83icbVC7SgNBFJ31GeMrai PYDAYhNmE3QbQzYGMZwTwgu4TZyWwyZB7LzKwQlv0NGwtFLGz8C T/Bzi/wKwQnj0ITD1w4nHMv994Txoxq47qfztLyyuraem4jv7m1 vbNb2NtvapkoTBpYMqnaIdKEUUEahhpG2rEiiIeMtMLh1dhv3RGl qRS3ZhSTgKO+oBHFyFjJ90sp7aaVapb5p91C0S27E8BF4s1I8fL 7XX4dvvJ6t/Dh9yROOBEGM6R1x3NjE6RIGYoZyfJ+okmM8BD1Scd SgTjRQTq5OYMnVunBSCpbwsCJ+nsiRVzrEQ9tJ0dmoOe9sfif10 lMdBGkVMSJIQJPF0UJg0bCcQCwRxXBho0sQVhReyvEA6QQNjamv A3Bm395kTQrZa9aPrtxi7USmCIHjsAxKAEPnIMauAZ10AAYxOAeP IInJ3EenGfnZdq65MxmDsAfOG8/MeuVgg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="o2t6 X/NZCO6iivSsGltp/0PuioY=">AAAB83icbVC7SgNBFJ31GeMrai PYDAYhNmE3QbQzYGMZwTwgu4TZyWwyZB7LzKwQlv0NGwtFLGz8C T/Bzi/wKwQnj0ITD1w4nHMv994Txoxq47qfztLyyuraem4jv7m1 vbNb2NtvapkoTBpYMqnaIdKEUUEahhpG2rEiiIeMtMLh1dhv3RGl qRS3ZhSTgKO+oBHFyFjJ90sp7aaVapb5p91C0S27E8BF4s1I8fL 7XX4dvvJ6t/Dh9yROOBEGM6R1x3NjE6RIGYoZyfJ+okmM8BD1Scd SgTjRQTq5OYMnVunBSCpbwsCJ+nsiRVzrEQ9tJ0dmoOe9sfif10 lMdBGkVMSJIQJPF0UJg0bCcQCwRxXBho0sQVhReyvEA6QQNjamv A3Bm395kTQrZa9aPrtxi7USmCIHjsAxKAEPnIMauAZ10AAYxOAeP IInJ3EenGfnZdq65MxmDsAfOG8/MeuVgg==</latexit>
i11
<latexit sha1_base64="1q4o 62pEH0u8qY7dWe5MZv0Egv0=">AAAB83icbVDLSgNBEOz1GeMr6k XwMhiEeAm7iujNgBePEcwDskuYncwmQ2Z2lplZISz5DS8eFPHgx Z/wE7z5BX6F4ORx0MSChqKqm+6uMOFMG9f9dBYWl5ZXVnNr+fWNz a3tws5uXctUEVojkkvVDLGmnMW0ZpjhtJkoikXIaSPsX438xh1V msn41gwSGgjcjVnECDZW8v1SxtqZ5w2H/nG7UHTL7hhonnhTUrz8 fpdf+6+i2i58+B1JUkFjQzjWuuW5iQkyrAwjnA7zfqppgkkfd2n L0hgLqoNsfPMQHVmlgyKpbMUGjdXfExkWWg9EaDsFNj09643E/7 xWaqKLIGNxkhoak8miKOXISDQKAHWYosTwgSWYKGZvRaSHFSbGxp S3IXizL8+T+knZOy2f3bjFSgkmyMEBHEIJPDiHClxDFWpAIIF7e IQnJ3UenGfnZdK64Exn9uAPnLcfLVKVfw==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="1q4o 62pEH0u8qY7dWe5MZv0Egv0=">AAAB83icbVDLSgNBEOz1GeMr6k XwMhiEeAm7iujNgBePEcwDskuYncwmQ2Z2lplZISz5DS8eFPHgx Z/wE7z5BX6F4ORx0MSChqKqm+6uMOFMG9f9dBYWl5ZXVnNr+fWNz a3tws5uXctUEVojkkvVDLGmnMW0ZpjhtJkoikXIaSPsX438xh1V msn41gwSGgjcjVnECDZW8v1SxtqZ5w2H/nG7UHTL7hhonnhTUrz8 fpdf+6+i2i58+B1JUkFjQzjWuuW5iQkyrAwjnA7zfqppgkkfd2n L0hgLqoNsfPMQHVmlgyKpbMUGjdXfExkWWg9EaDsFNj09643E/7 xWaqKLIGNxkhoak8miKOXISDQKAHWYosTwgSWYKGZvRaSHFSbGxp S3IXizL8+T+knZOy2f3bjFSgkmyMEBHEIJPDiHClxDFWpAIIF7e IQnJ3UenGfnZdK64Exn9uAPnLcfLVKVfw==</latexit>
i12
<latexit sha1_base64="6Vea 9sE0sMPXFdgjYKKsUklj2nE=">AAAB83icbVC7SgNBFJ2NrxhfUR vBZjAIsQm7EdHOgI1lBPOA7BJmJ7PJkHksM7NCWPY3bCwUsbDxJ /wEO7/ArxCcPApNPHDhcM693HtPGDOqjet+Orml5ZXVtfx6YWNza 3unuLvX1DJRmDSwZFK1Q6QJo4I0DDWMtGNFEA8ZaYXDq7HfuiNK UyluzSgmAUd9QSOKkbGS75dT2k29apb5J91iya24E8BF4s1I6fL7 XX4dvPJ6t/jh9yROOBEGM6R1x3NjE6RIGYoZyQp+okmM8BD1Scd SgTjRQTq5OYPHVunBSCpbwsCJ+nsiRVzrEQ9tJ0dmoOe9sfif10 lMdBGkVMSJIQJPF0UJg0bCcQCwRxXBho0sQVhReyvEA6QQNjamgg 3Bm395kTSrFe+0cnbjlmplMEUeHIIjUAYeOAc1cA3qoAEwiME9e ARPTuI8OM/Oy7Q158xm9sEfOG8/LtqVgA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="6Vea 9sE0sMPXFdgjYKKsUklj2nE=">AAAB83icbVC7SgNBFJ2NrxhfUR vBZjAIsQm7EdHOgI1lBPOA7BJmJ7PJkHksM7NCWPY3bCwUsbDxJ /wEO7/ArxCcPApNPHDhcM693HtPGDOqjet+Orml5ZXVtfx6YWNza 3unuLvX1DJRmDSwZFK1Q6QJo4I0DDWMtGNFEA8ZaYXDq7HfuiNK UyluzSgmAUd9QSOKkbGS75dT2k29apb5J91iya24E8BF4s1I6fL7 XX4dvPJ6t/jh9yROOBEGM6R1x3NjE6RIGYoZyQp+okmM8BD1Scd SgTjRQTq5OYPHVunBSCpbwsCJ+nsiRVzrEQ9tJ0dmoOe9sfif10 lMdBGkVMSJIQJPF0UJg0bCcQCwRxXBho0sQVhReyvEA6QQNjamgg 3Bm395kTSrFe+0cnbjlmplMEUeHIIjUAYeOAc1cA3qoAEwiME9e ARPTuI8OM/Oy7Q158xm9sEfOG8/LtqVgA==</latexit>
t
<latexit sha1_base64="pObh S+0tQZe4adDrcHWtorcxTN8=">AAAB7nicbZC7SgNBFIbPeo3xFr UUZDEIsQm7imhnwMYyAXOBZAmzk9lkyOzsMnNWCEtKH8DGQhFbK+ s8h53P4Es4uRSa+MPAx/+fw5xz/FhwjY7zZS0tr6yurWc2sptb2 zu7ub39mo4SRVmVRiJSDZ9oJrhkVeQoWCNWjIS+YHW/fzPO6/dMa R7JOxzEzAtJV/KAU4LGqrcKKQ5bp+1c3ik6E9mL4M4gf/0xqnw/ HI3K7dxnqxPRJGQSqSBaN10nRi8lCjkVbJhtJZrFhPZJlzUNShIy 7aWTcYf2iXE6dhAp8yTaE/d3R0pCrQehbypDgj09n43N/7JmgsGV l3IZJ8gknX4UJMLGyB7vbne4YhTFwAChiptZbdojilA0F8qaI7j zKy9C7azonhcvKk6+VICpMnAIx1AAFy6hBLdQhipQ6MMjPMOLFVt P1qv1Ni1dsmY9B/BH1vsPeveTWg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="pObh S+0tQZe4adDrcHWtorcxTN8=">AAAB7nicbZC7SgNBFIbPeo3xFr UUZDEIsQm7imhnwMYyAXOBZAmzk9lkyOzsMnNWCEtKH8DGQhFbK+ s8h53P4Es4uRSa+MPAx/+fw5xz/FhwjY7zZS0tr6yurWc2sptb2 zu7ub39mo4SRVmVRiJSDZ9oJrhkVeQoWCNWjIS+YHW/fzPO6/dMa R7JOxzEzAtJV/KAU4LGqrcKKQ5bp+1c3ik6E9mL4M4gf/0xqnw/ HI3K7dxnqxPRJGQSqSBaN10nRi8lCjkVbJhtJZrFhPZJlzUNShIy 7aWTcYf2iXE6dhAp8yTaE/d3R0pCrQehbypDgj09n43N/7JmgsGV l3IZJ8gknX4UJMLGyB7vbne4YhTFwAChiptZbdojilA0F8qaI7j zKy9C7azonhcvKk6+VICpMnAIx1AAFy6hBLdQhipQ6MMjPMOLFVt P1qv1Ni1dsmY9B/BH1vsPeveTWg==</latexit>
Tier 4
<latexit sha1 _base64="8tdDl1xrlLnzHZb0l YIegZlAmzg=">AAAB/XicbVDJS gNBEO1xjXEbl5sgjUGIlzDjgt4 MePGYQKJCZgg9nUrS2LPQXSPG IXjyP7x4UCRX/Q5vfoM/YSfx4P ag4PFeFVX1gkQKjY7zbk1MTk3P zObm8vMLi0vL9srqmY5TxaHOYx mri4BpkCKCOgqUcJEoYGEg4Ty4 PBn651egtIijGvYS8EPWiURbc IZGatrrXjHzEK4xqwlQtE/3+95 O0y44JWcE+pe4X6RwPHitftxtv laa9pvXinkaQoRcMq0brpOgnzG Fgkvo571UQ8L4JetAw9CIhaD9 bHR9n24bpUXbsTIVIR2p3ycyFm rdCwPTGTLs6t/eUPzPa6TYPvIz ESUpQsTHi9qppBjTYRS0JRRwlD 1DGFfC3Ep5lynG0QSWNyG4v1/ +S852S+5e6aDqFMpFMkaObJAtU iQuOSRlckoqpE44uSH35JE8Wbf Wg/VsDcatE9bXzBr5AevlEyrjm Lo=</latexit><latexit sha1 _base64="8tdDl1xrlLnzHZb0l YIegZlAmzg=">AAAB/XicbVDJS gNBEO1xjXEbl5sgjUGIlzDjgt4 MePGYQKJCZgg9nUrS2LPQXSPG IXjyP7x4UCRX/Q5vfoM/YSfx4P ag4PFeFVX1gkQKjY7zbk1MTk3P zObm8vMLi0vL9srqmY5TxaHOYx mri4BpkCKCOgqUcJEoYGEg4Ty4 PBn651egtIijGvYS8EPWiURbc IZGatrrXjHzEK4xqwlQtE/3+95 O0y44JWcE+pe4X6RwPHitftxtv laa9pvXinkaQoRcMq0brpOgnzG Fgkvo571UQ8L4JetAw9CIhaD9 bHR9n24bpUXbsTIVIR2p3ycyFm rdCwPTGTLs6t/eUPzPa6TYPvIz ESUpQsTHi9qppBjTYRS0JRRwlD 1DGFfC3Ep5lynG0QSWNyG4v1/ +S852S+5e6aDqFMpFMkaObJAtU iQuOSRlckoqpE44uSH35JE8Wbf Wg/VsDcatE9bXzBr5AevlEyrjm Lo=</latexit>
Tier 3
<latexit sha1 _base64="rzptBoPofh2vAbiRS MddvsqjHRk=">AAAB/XicbVDLS gNBEJz1bXytj5sgg0GIl7BrEL0 Z8OLRgNFANoTZSScOzj6Y6RXj snjyP7x4UCRX8x3e/AZ/wkniQR MLGoqqbrq7/FgKjY7zaU1Nz8zO zS8s5paWV1bX7PWNSx0likOVRz JSNZ9pkCKEKgqUUIsVsMCXcOXf nA78q1tQWkThBXZjaASsE4q24 AyN1LS3vELqIdxheiFA0YyWMm+ /aeedojMEnSTuD8mf9PqVr8ed/ nnT/vBaEU8CCJFLpnXddWJspEy h4BKynJdoiBm/YR2oGxqyAHQj HV6f0T2jtGg7UqZCpEP190TKAq 27gW86A4bXetwbiP959QTbx41U hHGCEPLRonYiKUZ0EAVtCQUcZd cQxpUwt1J+zRTjaALLmRDc8Zc nyeVB0S0VDytOvlwgIyyQbbJLC sQlR6RMzsg5qRJO7skTeSGv1oP 1bL1ZvVHrlPUzs0n+wHr/Bilcm Lk=</latexit><latexit sha1 _base64="rzptBoPofh2vAbiRS MddvsqjHRk=">AAAB/XicbVDLS gNBEJz1bXytj5sgg0GIl7BrEL0 Z8OLRgNFANoTZSScOzj6Y6RXj snjyP7x4UCRX8x3e/AZ/wkniQR MLGoqqbrq7/FgKjY7zaU1Nz8zO zS8s5paWV1bX7PWNSx0likOVRz JSNZ9pkCKEKgqUUIsVsMCXcOXf nA78q1tQWkThBXZjaASsE4q24 AyN1LS3vELqIdxheiFA0YyWMm+ /aeedojMEnSTuD8mf9PqVr8ed/ nnT/vBaEU8CCJFLpnXddWJspEy h4BKynJdoiBm/YR2oGxqyAHQj HV6f0T2jtGg7UqZCpEP190TKAq 27gW86A4bXetwbiP959QTbx41U hHGCEPLRonYiKUZ0EAVtCQUcZd cQxpUwt1J+zRTjaALLmRDc8Zc nyeVB0S0VDytOvlwgIyyQbbJLC sQlR6RMzsg5qRJO7skTeSGv1oP 1bL1ZvVHrlPUzs0n+wHr/Bilcm Lk=</latexit>
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the members of i’s out-neighbourhood are i’s downstream neighbours. We define a path
of length ` from i to j to be a sequence of distinct nodes, i, i1, i2, . . . , i`−1, j such that
gii1 = gi1i2 = · · · = gi`−1j = 1.
We assume that all nodes have at least one in-link and at least one out-link, so that
each i ∈ I lies on at least one path between s and t, and all paths between s and t are of
length m+ 1. Any network g belongs to the class of directed multipartite acyclic graphs.
An example network is presented in Figure 2.1.
2.2.2 Competition Structure
There is a single renewable resource at node s. All nodes in tier m have equal access to
this good. There is an infinite quantity of the good available, and it may be infinitely
divided into any positive real quantities.
There is a single market for the good at node t. At the market, there is a representative
consumer whose price is set according to an inverse demand function p(qt), where qt is
the total quantity of good available for purchase. We assume that the inverse demand
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function is linear, defined
p(qt) = 1− qt. (2.1)
At each node i ∈ I there is an intermediary. Each intermediary takes two actions: first,
he purchases the good from intermediaries in his in-neighbourhood; second, he allocates
the good to intermediaries in his out-neighbourhood. Within each tier, all intermediaries
act simultaneously, and the result of their actions governs the actions of the following
tier. The first tier to act is tier m, followed by m− 1, m− 2, and proceeding sequentially
until the intermediaries in tier 1 act. Intermediaries are profit maximisers, whose profit
is derived from the ability to resell the good at a greater price than their own purchase
price. We break down the two steps in the section below.
Action sequence for tier x ∈ {2, . . . ,m− 1}
Step 1: Buying the Good
Assume that, for all tiers y ∈ {x+ 1, ...m}, all intermediaries in Iy have acted; that
is, they have purchased the quantity of good they received and allocated a portion
of the good to each of their out-neighbours.
Then, the quantity qk,i that describes the amount of good flowing along each link
ek,i ∈ Ex+1,x is well defined. Each intermediary i ∈ Ix receives the sum of good
provided along each of his in-links, which is
qi =
∑
k∈N+i (g)
qk,i. (2.2)
The vector of quantities available to all intermediaries in tier x is qx ∈ R|Ix|+ .
When each intermediary is in possession of the good, they will allocate the good to
each of their downstream neighbours, resulting in some revenue for each intermedi-
ary i ∈ Ix, ri(qx), which is a function of qx. All intermediaries pay a price for the
good equal to their willingness-to-pay; that is, their marginal revenue from receiving
additional quantity of the good:
pi(qx) =
∂ri(qx)
∂qi
. (2.3)
The vector-valued function that determines the prices paid by all intermediaries
i ∈ Ix is px(qx) : R|Ix|+ → R|Ix|+ . This function describes the prices that each i ∈ Ix
will pay for each unit of good provided by an upstream neighbour in tier x+ 1.
Step 2: Selling the Good
Assume that there exists some vector qx ∈ R|Ix|+ .
Each intermediary i ∈ Ix must allocate the good to their downstream neighbours.
Intermediary i does so by choosing an amount qi,j ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ N−i (g), and we set
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qi,j = 0 ∀ j /∈ N−i (g). An intermediary may not sell more good than they receive,
and thus i’s strategy is subject to the constraint that∑
j∈N−i (g)
qi,j ≤ qi. (2.4)
Intermediary i’s action is the vector (qi,j) ∈ Si ∀ j ∈ N−i (g), where i’s action space
is the simplex Si ⊂ Rd
−
i
+ described by the constraint in Equation (2.4).
We assume that intermediaries in Ix may condition their strategies on the vector
qx, but not on the individual actions of any intermediaries in tiers x+ 1, . . . ,m. A
strategy for i is a function si(qx) : R|Ix|+ → Si that describes i’s allocation given any
vector qx.
The set of strategies si(qx) ∀ i ∈ Ix will determine the quantity of good provided
along each link e ∈ Ex,x−1. These quantities, in turn, will determine the quantities
available to each j ∈ Ix−1, according to Equation (2.2), giving the vector qx−1. Step 1
describes how qx−1 determines the prices paid by each intermediary in tier x− 1,
pj(qx−1) ∀ j ∈ Ix−1.
Once all intermediaries in tier x have employed their strategies, the revenue received
by each intermediary i ∈ Ix is as follows:
ri =
∑
j∈N−i (g)
qi,jpj(qx−1). (2.5)
Intermediaries are profit maximisers. The profit for any intermediary i ∈ Ix is determ-
ined by the difference between his revenue and cost according to the following function
pii(s, g) = ri − qipi(qx), (2.6)
where s is the vector of strategies (si) ∀ i ∈ I, which determines the quantity of the good
that is provided along each link. We make the simplifying assumption that there is no
processing cost for each intermediary. Adding a fixed cost per unit reduces equilibrium
prices by the amount of the fixed cost, which also has the effect of reducing equilibrium
quantities and profits.
2.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept employed is subgame-perfect-Nash equilibrium (SPE). Recall
that we assume agents in tier x may only condition their strategies on the vector qx, and
not the individual actions of any intermediaries in tiers {x+ 1, . . . ,m}. Then, for any
tier x, any vector qx ∈ R|Ix|+ describes a subgame where the intermediaries in Ix are active.
In making their allocation decisions, the intermediaries in Ix determine qx−1, and thus
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select the next subgame in our model.
The final subgame is described by q1. As all intermediaries in tier 1 have a single out-
link to the market (t), the intermediaries in I1 engage in a standard Cournot competition,
with the constraint that qit ≤ qi ∀ i ∈ I1. The outcome of subgame q1 determines qt, which
subsequently determines pt according to Equation (2.1).
As a condition of SPE, the decisions of each intermediary must induce a Nash equi-
librium at every subgame. That is, in any subgame qj, each intermediary’s strategy must
be a best response to each other intermediary’s strategy at that tier. Let si(qj) be inter-
mediary i’s action in subgame qx. Let s−i(qx) be the set of actions for all intermediaries
in the set
(∪y∈{1,...,x}Iy) \ i. Then, we formally define an SPE s∗ as the following: for all
x ∈ {2, . . . ,m} with ` = |Ix|, for all qx ∈ R`+, and for all i ∈ ∪y∈{1,...,j}Iy
pix
(
s∗i (qx) , s−i (qx) , g
) ≥ pix (s˜, s−i (qj) , g) , (2.7)
for all s˜ ∈ Si.
In Section 2.3.2 we will derive an explicit characterisation of the unique SPE that
exists on any network. To clarify the model, however, we first derive the equilibrium of a
simple network.
2.3.1 Equilibrium Example
Example 2.1. Consider the network gs in Figure 2.2, with n = 4 and m = 2.
Tier 0: The price at node t is
pt = 1− qt. (2.8)
Tier 1: Intermediaries i11 and i12 both sell to node t. The quantity available at t is
qt = q11,t + q22,t. (2.9)
Both i11 and i12 sell their entire quantity of good to t, and therefore
q11,t = q11 (2.10)
and
q12,t = q12. (2.11)
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Figure 2.2: The network gs
s
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The revenue received by i11 as a function of q11 and q12 is
r11(q11, q12) = ptq11,t (2.12)
= (1− qt) q11,t (2.13)
=
(
1− q11,t − q12,t
)
q11,t (2.14)
= (1− q11 − q12) q11 (2.15)
= q11 − q11q12 − q211. (2.16)
Finally, the price paid by i11 is equal to his marginal revenue per quantity received,
which is
p11(q11, q12) =
∂r11(q11,q12)
∂q11
(2.17)
= ∂
∂q11
(
q11 − q11q12 − q211
)
(2.18)
= 1− 2q11 − q12. (2.19)
Similar calculations reveal that
p12(q11, q12) = 1− q11 − 2q12. (2.20)
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Tier 2: The quantities of good arriving at i11 and i12 are
q11 = q21,11 (2.21)
and
q12 = q21,12 + q22,12. (2.22)
Intermediary i21 may sell his quantity to i11 or i12, and i22 may only sell his quantity
to i12. Therefore,
q21,11 + q21,12 = q21. (2.23)
and
q22,12 = q22. (2.24)
Intermediary i21’s revenue is
r21(q21,11, q21,12; q12) = p11q21,11 + p12q21,12 (2.25)
= (1− 2q11 − q12)q21,11 + (1− q11 − 2q12) q21,12 (2.26)
=
(
1− 2q21,11 −
(
q21,12 + q22,12
))
q21,11
+
(
1− q21,11 − 2
(
q21,12 + q22,12
))
q21,12
(2.27)
=
(
1− 2q21,11 −
(
q21,12 + q22
))
q21,11
+
(
1− q21,11 − 2
(
q21,12 + q22
))
q21,12.
(2.28)
Intermediary i21 selects q21,11 and q21,12 in such a manner to maximise his revenue.
Intermediary i21 acts simultaneously with i22. However, because i22 has only one out-
link, i21 may take i22’s actions as given. Intermediary i21’s optimisation problem is
then
(q21,11, q21,12) = arg max
a, b
(
1− 2a− (b+ q22)
)
a+
(
1− a− 2 (b+ q22)
)
b
subject to a+ b ≤ q21.
(2.29)
Solving this optimisation problem yields
q21,11 =
1
2
q21 +
1
4
q22 (2.30)
and
q21,12 =
1
2
q21 − 1
4
q22. (2.31)
Substituting Equations (2.24), (2.30) and (2.31) into Equation (2.28) yields i21’s
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Table 2.1: Equilibrium quantities, profits, and prices for network gs
Node Quantity Price Profit
i21 0.25 0 0.0972
i22 0.1667 0 0.0556
i11 0.1667 0.4167 0.0278
i12 0.25 0.3333 0.0625
t 0.4167 0.5833 CS = 0.0868
revenue with respect to quantities q21 and q22:
r21(q21, q22) = q21 − 3
2
q221 −
3
2
q21q22 +
1
8
q222. (2.32)
Finally,
p21(q21, q22) =
∂r21(q21,q22)
∂q21
(2.33)
= 1− 3q21 − 3
2
q22. (2.34)
And, by similar calculations,
p22(q21, q22) = 1− 3
2
q21 − 15
4
q22. (2.35)
By assumption, intermediaries in the top tier have access to the good at zero cost. To
derive the quantity of good flowing through the network, we solve the system of equations
obtained from setting the prices in Equations (2.34) and (2.35) to zero.
1− 3q21 − 3
2
q22 = 0, and (2.36)
1− 3
2
q21 − 15
4
q22 = 0. (2.37)
This yields the following quantities for i21 and i22,
q21 =
1
4
(2.38)
and
q22 =
1
6
. (2.39)
The initial quantities chosen by i21 and i22 determine the quantity of goods flowing
along each downstream link in the network gs. Table 2.1 shows the equilibrium quantities,
prices, and profits for the network gs. Figure 2.3 graphically represents the equilibrium
flow of good through the network; each edge is weighted by the amount of good flowing
along the edge, and each node is weighted by the profit received by the intermediary at the
node.
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Figure 2.3: Equilibrium quantities and profits for the network gs
s
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2.3.2 Equilibrium Characterisation
In Section 2.3.1, we proceeded with the assumption that, in equilibrium, any intermediary
will allocate their entire quantity of good to their downstream neighbours. While not a
prerequisite for the model, the logic that supports this assumption is straightforward. The
price paid by any intermediary is equal to their marginal revenue from additional units
received. If it is optimal for an intermediary i ∈ I to allocate less than his entire quantity
of the good to his downstream neighbours, then i is not making use of his marginal units
of the good and his marginal revenue is zero. But, then i’s price must also be zero, and
no upstream intermediary would be willing to sell any quantity of the good to i, which
would mean that i’s quantity of the good must be zero. We formally state this in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. In any equilibrium s∗ on a network g,∑
j∈N+i (g)
qi,j = qi (2.40)
for all i ∈ I.
Equilibrium quantities are determined through backward induction, beginning in tier 1
and proceeding through the network until tier m. In tier 1, Proposition 2.1 ensures that
all intermediaries sell their entire quantity of good to the single market. Then, for any
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quantity vector q1,
qt =
∑
i∈I1
qi. (2.41)
Equation (2.1) determines pt, and for each i ∈ I1, i’s marginal revenue from qi is
dri
dqi
= d
dqi
ptqi (2.42)
= pt + qi
∂pt
∂qi
(2.43)
= pt − qi. (2.44)
Calculating dri
dqi
for each i ∈ I1 will yield the unique vector-valued function p1(q1).
When the intermediaries in tier 2 act, they have two key pieces of information: q2,
the quantities of the good that each of the intermediaries in tier 2 holds, and p1(q1),
the function that determines the prices that each of the intermediaries in tier 2 will
receive after making their simultaneous allocations. In equilibrium, these intermediaries
will convert this information to a unique set of strategies satisfying the SPE condition in
Equation (2.7). The process to determine each intermediary’s action is threefold. First,
we show that the intermediaries i ∈ I2 are participating in a potential game, indicating
that there is a potential function, Φ2(q2), whose unique global maximum is bijective
to each individual intermediary’s profit maximising actions (see Monderer and Shapley
1996). Second, we perform Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimisation to find the actions for each
intermediary in tier 2 that maximise Φ2(q2). Finally, we determine prices p2(q2) by finding
dri
dqi
for each i ∈ I2 at the optimal actions.
The following proposition describes this process algebraically.
Proposition 2.2. Assume that the actions of all intermediaries describe an SPE. Con-
sider tiers x− 1 and x, where |Ix−1| = ` and |Ix| = k. Suppose there exists a matrix Xx−1
such that px−1 = 1` −Xx−1qx−1. Then, there exist unique well-defined matrices Ux, Dx,
and Fx such that
px = 1k −Xxqx, (2.45)
where
Xx = 2
[
Ux
(
DxXx−1DTx ◦ Fx
)−1
UTx
]−1
, (2.46)
and ◦ denotes the Hadamard product.
Using Proposition 2.2, we may generate the function p2(q2) given the inputs p1(q1).
This is the information that intermediaries in tier 3 will need, along with their quantity
allocations q3, to generate their own actions. Repeated applications of Proposition 2.2
may then be used to generate the pricing functions px(qx) for each x ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, which
are defined by the matrices Xx for each tier x ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
At this stage, pricing in the network is determined for any set of network flows, but
the actual equilibrium strategy, s∗, has yet to be determined. To calculate quantities
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requires a set of prices for the agents in the top tier, and we make use of the assumption
that pm = 0. Then, rearranging Equation (2.45) for qm yields
qm = X
−1
m 1, (2.47)
with 1 denoting the unit vector.
The proof of Proposition 2.2 (which is in Appendix B.2) includes the determination
of each intermediary’s individual action, which determines the quantity allocated on each
link between tiers x and x− 1, qx,x−1, and the quantity vector for tier x− 1, qx−1, given
the quantities qx, for any x ∈ {2, . . . ,m}. These functions are presented in the following
corollary.
Corollary 2.1. Given qx, for any x ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, the equilibrium quantity allocations
along each link in Ex,x−1 are
qx,x−1 = ATxqx, (2.48)
and the equilibrium quantity allocations to the intermediaries in tier x− 1 are
qx−1 = DTxA
T
xqx, (2.49)
where
Ax =
1
2
XxUx
(
DxXx−1DTx ◦ FTx
)−1
. (2.50)
Beginning with the quantities qm, repeated applications of Corollary 2.1 will determine
the quantity flow of the good through the entire network.
The derivation of each of the matrices Dx, Ux, and Fx is left to Appendix B.1. Dx,
which we refer to as the downstream matrix, is a binary matrix that maps the set of edges
Ex,x−1 to the intermediaries in Ix−1. Ux, the upstream matrix, maps the intermediaries
in Ix to the edges in Ex,x−1. Finally, Fx, the potential adjustment, is used to convert
the revenue from each edge to a potential game for the intermediaries in Ix. For each
intermediary in Ix, Fx provides a weighted sum of the revenues according to whether or
not edges share the same tails in Ix
2.4 Adding and Removing Links
Adding a link between intermediaries who are not already connected will create two new
opportunities. For the seller, he has access to a new buyer of the good; allocating good
to the new buyer will create a new revenue stream, and reducing quantity supplied to his
existing buyers will increase the prices they pay. For the buyer, he has one more seller
competing to sell him the good, reducing each individual seller’s ability to influence his
price. In this section, we address the question of which potential links will receive the
greatest quantity of the good when added.
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Finding such links achieves two purposes. First, sellers allocate their quantity of
good in order to maximise their revenues, which is equivalent to equalising their marginal
revenues along each outgoing link. Amongst all possible new out-links for a seller, the
link that, when added, would carry the maximal quantity of good for any seller leaves a
minimal amount of good allocated to existing links, which means that it must also be the
new link that maximises marginal revenue and profit. Second, in Section 2.5, we discuss
how consumer surplus for any network is an increasing function of the quantity of the
good arriving at node t. While our analysis is limited to the local impact within a network
of adding a new link, a social planner whose goal is to increase the total quantity of good
flowing through the entire network would likely succeed by focussing on new links that
would carry a maximal amount of good.
The allocation decision for an intermediary with a single out-link is straightforward:
he will allocate his entire quantity of good to his single buyer. Otherwise, as revenue
maximisers, intermediaries will distribute their good such that the marginal benefit they
receive from the quantity of good provided to each link is equal. When intermediary i
has an out-link to j, i’s revenue along this link is qijpj(qij, q−ij), where we abuse notation
and allow q−ij to be set of quantities provided along all links in the network excluding
eij. Holding q−ij fixed, i’s marginal revenue with respect to qij is
d
dqij
qijpj(qij, q−ij) = pj + qij
∂pj
∂qj
. (2.51)
Equating marginal revenue along each out-link determines the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3. Let s∗ be an equilibrium. For all i ∈ I,
pj + qij
∂pj
∂qj
= pk + qik
∂pk
∂qk
, (2.52)
for all j, k ∈ N−i (g).
Given that each intermediary’s price is set equal to their marginal revenue, we can
also establish the following corollary.
Corollary 2.2. Let s∗ be an equilibrium. For all i ∈ I \ Im,
pi = pj + qij
∂pj
∂qj
, (2.53)
for all j ∈ N−i (g).
From Equation (2.53), i’s marginal revenue can be separated into the difference
between two components for each buyer: the first is the buyer’s price, and the second is
the product of the quantity i sells to the buyer and the rate at which that buyer’s price
changes with quantity,
∂pj
∂qj
, which is negative.
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In Equation (2.53), pj is a function of qij. Again holding q−ij fixed, we set pj−i to be
the price j would pay for the quantity of good provided by all connected sellers excluding
i. That is, pj−i = pj(0, q−ij). Then, we may conclude that
pj = pj−i + qij
∂pj
∂qj
. (2.54)
Finally, we can substitute Equation (2.54) into Equation (2.53) to find the marginal
revenue that i receives from each out-link in equilibrium as a function of i’s allocation,
holding the actions of all other intermediaries fixed.
pi = pj−i + qij
∂pj
∂qj
+ qij
∂pj
∂qj
(2.55)
pi = pj−i + 2qij
∂pj
∂qj
. (2.56)
Whenever intermediary i is selling good to an intermediary j, the price paid by i in
equilibrium is the difference of pj−1, the price j would pay if qij = 0, and −2qij ∂pj∂qj , i’s
individual effect on j’s price.
Equation (2.56) must hold in equilibrium for all intermediaries j ∈ N−i (g). Rearran-
ging Equation (2.56) reveals the quantity of good that intermediary i will allocate to each
j ∈ N−i (g) in equilibrium,
qij =
pj−i − pi
−2∂pj
∂qj
. (2.57)
From Equation (2.57), we see the factors that contribute to the amount of the good
that will be allocated to a new link from intermediary i to j. The numerator increases
when the current price being paid by intermediary j is increases, as intermediary i will
receive the a greater amount of revenue from his first marginal unit allocated along the
new link. The denominator will decrease as the magnitude of
∂pj
∂qj
decreases, as this will
mean that j’s price is less sensitive to the quantity of the good that j receives from i. Any
additional quantity that i allocates to i will reduce the revenue that i is already receiving
from j by a smaller amount.
2.5 Efficiency
In this section, we evaluate which network structures are optimal for consumers, which
we measure according to the consumer surplus at node t. Because we have assumed a
linear inverse demand function in Equation (2.1), consumer surplus is equal to 1
2
q2t . As
consumer surplus is strictly increasing in function of qt, we may say that if the market
quantities in networks g and g′ are qt and q′t, respectively, and if qt < q
′
t, then consumers
have greater consumer surplus under network g′.
We begin by contrasting the two networks that represent a minimal and maximal level
of competition between intermediaries. Define the following two networks.
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Figure 2.4: Sparse and dense networks with m = 2 and n = 4
(a) Sparse network
s
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(b) Dense network
s
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Definition 2.1 (Sparse Network). gs(m, k) is the network with m+ 2 tiers and k inter-
mediaries in each tier, such that d+i = 1 ∀ i ∈ I and d−i = 1 ∀ i ∈ I.
Definition 2.2 (Dense Network). gc(P(I)) is the network on partition P(I) where,
∀ i ∈ Ij, d+i =
∣∣Ij−1∣∣ and d−i = ∣∣Ij+1∣∣.
gs(m, k) is a network with minimal competition: every intermediary has exactly one
in-link and one out-link such that there are k distinct intermediation chains of length
m+ 2 running from s to t. In contrast, gc(P(I)) has the maximal amount of competition:
in each tier every intermediary has links to all agents in the next tier. The market quantity
in these two networks is determined by the following propositions.
Proposition 2.4. For the network gs(m, k),
qt =
k
(2m + k − 1) . (2.58)
Proposition 2.5. For the network gc(P(I)),
qt =
 ∏
k∈{1,...,m}
|Ik|
|Ik|+ 1
 . (2.59)
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Proposition 2.5 is consistent with Corbett and Karmarkar (Proposition 6, 2001) who
solved for the optimal quantities when each tier consists of a pool of intermediaries, all
of whom have equal access to the quantity of good provided by the previous tier. Their
setup is equivalent to the model presented here on any dense network.
Propositions 2.4 and 2.5 demonstrate that network structure plays a key role in de-
termining consumer surplus. For fixed m and k, the lack of competition in the sparse
network ensures that intermediaries supply less of the good relative to the dense market,
reducing consumer surplus. We construct a measure of the consumers’ loss due to incom-
pleteness. First, define the function qt(g) to be the amount of good received at node t
under the network g.
Definition 2.3 (Price of Incompleteness). For any network g
(P(I)) on the partition
P(I), the price of incompleteness is the inverse ratio of the market quantity of the good
to the market quantity of the good under a dense network. That is,
PoI
(
g
(P(I))) = qt
(
gc
(P(I)))
qt
(
g
(P(I))) . (2.60)
As the price of incompleteness increases, consumers are less well off. PoI measures the
aggregate effects of the intermediaries’ market power in the network; intermediaries with
market power may reduce their quantity of good sold in order to increase downstream
prices, and this results in less of the good arriving at the market.
In the most extreme case, the price of incompleteness for the sparse network is equal
to
PoI
(
gs(k,m)
)
=
qt
(
gc(k,m)
)
qt
(
gs(k,m)
) (2.61)
=
(
k
k+1
)m
(−1 + 2m + k)
k
, (2.62)
which follows from Propositions 2.4 and 2.5. By taking the first and second derivatives
of this function we can easily show the following proposition.
Proposition 2.6. For any fixed k ≥ 2, for m ≥ 2, PoI(gs(k,m)) is an increasing convex
function of m.
As a result, we conclude that, for fixed-tier size, as the length of a network grows,
the potential loss to consumers due to incomplete markets grows without bound at an
increasing rate.
2.6 Conclusion
We have developed a model where intermediaries in a network convey a good from its
source to a consumer market. Intermediaries compete in quantity, selecting the amount
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of the good to provide to each downstream intermediary. The price received for the good
is equal to a downstream intermediary’s willingness-to-pay, which is the marginal revenue
that they will receive when they in turn sell the good further downstream.
In contrast to posted price models, intermediaries will not always seek the highest price
available. Because price decreases as quantity increases, intermediaries may increase the
revenue they receive from a downstream neighbour by lowering the quantity that neigh-
bour receives. As such, an optimal decision for any intermediary will involve distributing
their quantity of good across their available buyers. When an intermediary has exclusive
access to a buyer, their ability to determine downstream prices is greatest, and this ability
diminishes when they must compete with other sellers.
We have found an analytical solution to our intermediation chain model. While there
is some prior literature that incorporates quantity competition into supply chains, we
are only aware of models where the complexity has required that the models be solved
numerically. The existence of an analytical solution allows for increased ability to analyse
the interactions between players and the dynamics of the model.
We have discussed the role of competition in the model, and how competition determ-
ines the welfare of consumers in the final market. Incomplete markets reduce consumer
welfare, as incompleteness provides opportunities for intermediaries to withhold the good
to raise prices and increase their revenues. To measure this effect, we devised a measure
called the price of incompleteness, and showed that as intermediation chains get longer
the maximum potential price of incompleteness increases at an increasing rate.

Chapter 3
Games on Multi-Layer Networks
3.1 Introduction
At work, school, or in our communities, we will often have opportunity to share the
work of others for our own benefit. We get to enjoy the sights and smells when our
neighbours plant their gardens, and just one co-author’s brilliant insight may be enough
to push a group project forward. These are instances of non-excludable local public goods,
where individual contributions are shared by anyone with access to them. Our research
is inspired by the example of research and development between firms. Firms may invest
to innovate new technologies, but technological breakthroughs may quickly be adopted
by other firms, and firms may be incentivised to withhold investment in the hope that
others will innovate first.
Firms may have multiple research opportunities and limited resources, and maximising
profit requires allocating these resources to where they are most efficient. In our model,
return on investment has two factors: declining returns when multiple connected firms
research the same technology, and increased costs when a firm spreads its resources widely
across many technologies. Our work answers questions as to how firms, or any agents in
networks, will best allocate their resources between networks.
Because firms have research links in multiple technologies, there are multiple over-
lapping networks in which they connect, and actions in each network are strategically
determined by the linking structure and the investments of other firms in all networks.
Multiple networks may be used to model many situations; for instance, as individuals we
have networks of friends and networks of colleagues, with each relationship providing a
different set of costs and rewards. Nearly all prior network literature involves agents in a
single network; thus, we believe research connecting strategic decision making in multiple
networks is novel, and will help to open new ways of thinking about how agents connect.
There is one set of agents with two public goods to invest in. Each good has a distinct
set of connections describing the pairs of agents who share benefits, and benefits for any
agent depend solely upon the total investment of all agents they share links with in a good.
Because of the cost of investing, an agent will always prefer a neighbour’s investment to an
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equal amount of their own investment. Firms will, when possible, seek to avoid investment
when their neighbours are willing to bear the cost of investing instead.
Agents who make the choice to invest in both goods face an increased marginal cost
relative to their investment in each good. This effect is labelled distraction, and measures
inefficiency from spreading research efforts too widely. As distraction increases, firms are
more heavily penalised for investing in both goods, which will incentivise them to select
one good for investment. When there is no distraction, the investment decisions for each
good are independent, and the model nests the work of Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007).
Because marginal benefit decreases when neighbours invest, two linked agents are
strategic substitutes. As well, because distraction decreases investment payoffs, an agent’s
two investments are strategic substitutes. We show how each of these factors affects
equilibrium, and prove the existence in any network of equilibria where any investing
agent receives no investment help from her neighbours.
Welfare is measured according to two factors: aggregate payoff and the distribution of
payoffs. Owing to each agent’s self-interested decision making, investment will always be
less than an aggregate payoff maximising level, as the externalities from investment are
always positive. We discuss how an agent’s neighbours affect his choice of which good to
invest in, which can factor into an agent selecting the wrong investment good with respect
to aggregate welfare. We establish that agents who invest in both goods will always be
the least well-off agents in any equilibrium.
Increasing the cost of investment will decrease the payoff generated by any agent who
invests in both layers, when holding the investments of all agents fixed. However, strategic
implications when agents act in response to an increase in distraction may provide benefit
to these investors. As making two investments becomes unprofitable, investors are forced
to choose a single good for investment. This raises minimum payoffs in a network, as
dual-investors fair worst, and, so long as there are other investors to replace the lost
investment, the efficiency of investments can rise. Adding links is often beneficial for
aggregate payoff, as new links spread investment benefits, but some links may reduce
aggregate payoff if they connect investors who respond by lowering their investments.
For an equilibrium to be stable—when a sequence of myopic best responses by all
agents to a small perturbation of equilibrium converges to the original equilibrium—
requires additional constraints on the connections of any non-investing agent. As well,
these constraints are more strict when a non-investing agent is only linked to investors
who invest in both goods. This leads to the conclusion that the subset of equilibria that
are stable will be the most equitable equilibria, as they will contain a higher proportion
of investors in one good versus those who invest in none or both.
We discuss an adaption of the model that, while simplifying payoff structure, allows for
a much broader set of strategic interactions. On each layer, actions between agents may
be strategic complements or substitutes, and this flexibility applies also to the relationship
between an agent’s two actions. In this simplified extension, we show the parameter space
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on which a unique equilibrium exists.
This chapter contributes to an extensive literature on public good investment, where
public goods are generally undersupplied by voluntary contributions. Warr (1983) and
Bergstrom et al. (1986) show that aggregate contribution and individual consumption
are invariant to transfers between contributing agents, provided that transfers leave the
level of consumption of all contributing agents above their original level of private con-
sumption. Network models allow for local public goods, where benefits are shared only
by agents connected to contributors (e.g. Allouch 2015; Allouch 2017; Bramoulle´ and
Kranton 2007). Elliott and Golub’s (2019) model has one universal public good and a
weighted network describing heterogeneous inter-agent benefits from contribution. Foster
and Rosenweig (1995) empirically show that knowledge does spread through a network,
but more slowly than it would if individuals were considering their neighbours. In con-
trast to these models, our model is novel because it has two public goods on two networks;
each good is underinvested in, and an agent’s choice of good may have positive or negative
externalities for neighbours.
We contribute to the study of strategic decision-making in networks. In these games,
the connections between agents determine the strategic effects that their actions have
on each other. The following surveys: Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2016) and Jackson and
Zenou (2015), and books: Goyal (2007) and Jackson (2008), provide a starting point for
this literature. Linear quadratic payoff models are highly flexible, allowing for a wide
range of strategic effects through the adjustment of a single parameter (e.g. Ballester,
Calvo´-Armengol et al. 2006; Ballester, Zenou et al. 2010; Calvo´-Armengol and Zenou
2004). Bramoulle´, Kranton and D’Amours’s (2014) generic model nests many of these
games, and they analyse what drives games of strategic substitutes to have corner solutions
and multiple equilibria. Galeotti et al. (2010) find that when agents in games of strategic
substitutes have incomplete network information and act upon their expected location in
a network, unique equilibria exist. By connecting two networks in our model, we show
that the outcome in one network determines the set of potential outcomes in the other.
Our model helps to explain a problem of allocating resources in a network. When
agents have a fixed budget to invest, they are unable to invest in all profitable oppor-
tunities and must find the set of investments that is most efficient (e.g. Baumann 2015;
Bloch and Dutta 2009; Salonen 2014). In contrast, in our model an agent’s budget is
unconstrained, but the choice of taking multiple investments makes each investment less
profitable. Thus, a profit optimising agent may be forced to choose between two network
actions that are independently profitable because they are strategic substitutes.
We contribute to the understanding of how network links may create or reinforce
inequality. Dalton (1920) and Atkinson (1970) explore which measures of dispersion in
a population best capture inequality. In Gagnon and Goyal’s (2017) model, agents have
a network action and a market action. Taking the market action changes the network
payoffs; and when poorer agents in the network receive greater benefit from the network
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action, inequality falls. In our model, both actions are network actions, but costly actions
in one network provide benefits in the other, which can reduce inequality.
Our model provides insight into the costs, benefits and strategies induced by R&D net-
works. In some models (e.g. Goyal, Konovalov et al. 2008; Goyal and Moraga-Gonza´lez
2001) cost reduction is greatest when firms cooperate, and prior to market competition
research spending is complementary. In Westbrock (2010), links provide fixed R&D bene-
fits. Our model follows most closely the assumptions of Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007),
that one firm’s research may substitute for another firm’s research, and because firms do
not consider the benefits they provide to their neighbours they will invest below a level
that is efficient.
This chapter contributes a new model of multi-layer networks. There are few existing
papers where agents interact concurrently in multiple networks. Ko¨nig et al. (2014)
model firms who compete in local markets after making cost-reducing investments in R&D
networks. The price-determining markets are modelled as overlapping coalitions. Chen
et al. (2018) focus primarily on a single layer model, but they provide an extension where
agents are connected in two networks with an action on each network, where strategic
network effects are complements. Joshi et al. (2019) have a model where agents begin in a
fixed network. They then form links to create a second network, where the benefits from
network positioning are jointly derived from the two networks. Excluding our own model,
we are not aware of any multi-layer models where inter-agent actions on both layers may
be strategic substitutes.
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 presents the model. Section 3.3 provides
analysis of equilibrium, welfare properties, comparative statics, and stable equilibrium.
Section 3.4 includes further discussion of the model and its implications. Section 3.5
discusses potential extensions. Section 3.6 concludes. All proofs are provided in Ap-
pendix C.1.
3.2 Model
There are n agents, each existing in the set N = {1, . . . , n}. These agents have the oppor-
tunity to invest effort in two non-excludable, local public goods, good 1 and good 2. Each
public good has a distinct set of links that describe pairs of agents who share the benefits
of public good investment. The set of links for good p is gp, ∀ p ∈ {1, 2}, which contains
a binary element gpij for each pair of agents i, j ∈ N . If a link exists in good p between i
and j then gpij = 1, otherwise g
p
ij = 0. Each set of links will be referred to as a separate
layer of the network. Each layer is undirected, meaning that a link between agents i and
j in layer p is a link between j and i, and gpij = g
p
ji ∀ i, j ∈ N, ∀ p ∈ {1, 2}. As well, we
assume that an agent does not link to herself, implying gpii = 0 ∀ i ∈ N, ∀ p ∈ {1, 2}. In
g + gpij, g
p
ij = 1 and all other links are as in g. Similarly, in g − gpij, gpij = 0 and all other
links are as in g. The matrix whose i, jth element is gpij will be denoted G
p.
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In the layer gp, any agent sharing a link with agent i is connected to i in gp,
and the set of all agents connected to agent i are i’s neighbours in gp, denoted
Ni(g
p) = {j ∈ N | gpij = 1}. Agent i′s neighbourhood in gp is the union of i′s neighbours
and i. Agent i’s cardinality in gp is the the number of neighbours that agent i has in g
p,
denoted ηpi =
∣∣Ni(gp)∣∣. An agent with no neighbours in gp is considered to be in autarky .
Agents choose to invest in one, both, or neither of the public goods. An agent i’s
investment is si = (s
1
i , s
2
i ) ∈ S, where S is a convex subset of R2+ that includes the invest-
ment (0, 0). The profile of all investments in the network is the two-dimensional vector
s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Sn.
In each layer, the network structure and action set are consistent with many existing
network games. While there are a small number of models addressed in Section 3.1 that
include aspects of two networks, our model is the only model we are aware of that combines
two actions on two separate layers into a multi-layer network with a single payoff function.
The payoff of any agent is defined by the following function:
Πi(s | g) = f
s1i + ∑
j∈Ni(g1)
s1j
− cs1i + f
s2i + ∑
j∈Ni(g2)
s2j
− cs2i − βs1i s2i . (3.1)
The benefit function f is twice-differentiable and strictly concave, with f(0) = 0, f ′(·) > 0,
f ′′(·) < 0, and f ′(0) > c. Because f is the same in both layers, comparative analysis
is restricted to differences in the linking structure between the two layers. However,
extending the model to allow for different benefit functions is straightforward and many
of the conclusions persist. c > 0 is a fixed cost of investment that is constant across both
layers.
The term βs1i s
2
i incorporates the cost of investing in two layers simultaneously. The
marginal cost of investing in one layer for any agent i increases with their investment in
the other layer. In a research context, this may represent an increased cost to a firm of
spreading their efforts across multiple technologies. In keeping with this example, we will
refer to β as a measure of distraction. As β increases, the cost of spreading effort across
both layers increases as well. We assume that β ≥ 0.
This cost term has some convenient properties. First, when β = 0, cost is additively
separable into cs1i + cs
2
i , and decisions in one layer are independent from actions in the
other. Second, when sqi = 0, the cost in layer g
p, cspi , is independent of β—when an agent
only invests in one of the two layers, their investment decision is independent of β.
Because an agent’s investment provides benefit to all of his neighbours, this is a game
of positive externalities. As well, if agent i makes an investment in layer gp, and i and
j are neighbours in gp, then j’s marginal benefit from investment in gp will fall. Thus,
for neighbours in layer gp, investments in gp are strategic substitutes. Because an agent’s
decision to invest in one layer increases the marginal cost for that agent of investment
in the other, an agent’s two investment opportunities are strategic substitutes for one
another. To distinguish between these two different strategic effects, we refer to the
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investments of two agents connected in a layer as inter-agent strategic substitutes, whereas
a single agent’s two investments are intra-agent strategic substitutes.
The degree of substitution between an agent’s two investments increases with β. When
β = 0, the two layers are disjoint , equilibrium decisions in one layer are independent of
equilibrium decisions in the other layer. As β →∞, agents will be unable to invest in
both layers, and each agent must choose at most one layer to invest in. On intermediate
values of β, agents may select investment in both layers, but the additional costs from
the substitution effect of β may make them less likely to do so.
3.3 Analysis
Our model gives rise to four main questions: First, does equilibrium exist, and can we
characterise the behaviour of all agents in equilibrium? Second, what are the welfare prop-
erties in equilibrium, measured both by aggregate payoff and the distribution of payoffs
in the population? Third, how do equilibrium and welfare change with the model’s para-
meters, specifically distraction and the linking structure? Finally, under what conditions
do stable equilibria exist, and what are the welfare properties of stable equilibria?
As we have highlighted, when β = 0, an agent’s two investment choices are independ-
ent, and the problem of maximising payoff for any agent is separable into maximising
payoff on each layer. Thus, by setting β = 0, our model nests a base case presented by
Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007). We will provide comparison of our new results to this
base case, but will not repeat their results in this chapter.
3.3.1 Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept used is Nash equilibrium. A strategy profile s∗ is a Nash equi-
librium if, for any agent i, strategy s∗i is a strategy that maximises i’s payoff, given all
other agents invest according to s∗. More formally, s∗ is a Nash equilibrium if
Πi(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i | g) ≥ Πi(si, s∗−i | g), ∀ si ∈ S, ∀ i ∈ N, (3.2)
where s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn) denotes the profile of investments by all agents
excluding i.
We divide agents in equilibrium into three types: an agent who invests in both layers
is a dual-actor , an agent who invests in only one layer is a single-actor , and an agent who
does not invest at all is a free-rider . As well, an investor may be classified as a specialist
if they are providing all of the investment in their neighbourhood, or as an intermediate
investor if they are investing along with one or more neighbours. An equilibrium is
specialised if all investors are specialists, distributed if there are no specialists, and a
hybrid if it does not conform to either preceding category.
While S may be unbounded, for analysis we need only consider the feasible action
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space, S˜, defined to be the set of all si ∈ S that may be optimal for an agent i—meaning
that for some network (N, g) and set of actions s−i, si may maximise i’s payoff. The
concavity of f ensures that S˜ is a compact subset of S. On this set, we make the following
assumption.
Assumption 3.1. f ′′(s1i )f
′′(s2i ) > β
2 ∀ si ∈ S˜
Assumption 3.1 is sufficient to guarantee that the payoff function Πi(s | g) is always
concave on S˜. This, in turn, is used to show that any agent’s optimal action on any
network is uniquely determined by the actions of all other agents. We begin with the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (Existence). Assume that Assumption 3.1 holds. On any network (N, g)
there exists a specialist Nash equilibrium.
The importance of specialist equilibria is reinforced in Section 3.3.4, where we discuss
stable equilibria—equilibria for which a series of myopic best responses to a sufficiently
small perturbation will converge on the original equilibria. There, we will show that stable
equilibria must be specialist equilibria.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 relies on a complete characterisation of how all agents must
act in equilibrium, which follows in Section 3.3.1. We prove the existence of equilibrium
on any network with n = 2, then proceed inductively. For any network (N, g), we select
an arbitrary agent k, and assume the existence of a specialised equilibrium on the reduced
network (N \ k, g). First, we determine when k’s best-response action to the actions of
the other agents does not force any of the other agents to change their action. Next,
where this is not the case, we construct a finite sequence of action changes that must
terminate in a specialised equilibrium.
The feasible set: S˜
An agent i acting in a single-layer network will have a profitable investment opportunity
if their local investment , the sum of all of their neighbour’s investments, is less than sˆs,
where sˆs is the unique solution to f
′(sˆs) = c (see Bramoulle´ and Kranton 2007). Agent
i’s investment is si = sˆs − s¯i, with s¯i =
∑
j∈Ni(g) sj. We extend this to a two-layer case
by letting s¯pi =
∑
j∈Ni(gp) s
p
j ∀ p ∈ {1, 2}, and conclude that an agent i will never invest in
either layer if s¯pi ≥ sˆs ∀ p ∈ {1, 2}.
When s¯pi < sˆs and s¯
q
i ≥ sˆs, then i’s actions are relatively straightforward. Agent i will
invest only in layer gp, making investment si = {sˆs − s¯pi , 0}.
When both s¯pi < sˆs and s¯
q
i < sˆs, for p 6= q, then i’s decision is more complex. The
marginal benefit of an investment of spi is
∂Πi(s|g)
∂spi
= f ′(spi + s¯
p
i )− c− βsqi . Therefore, for
any agent i in equilibrium, it must always be the case that
f ′(s1i + s¯
1
i )− βs2i − c ≤ 0 and (3.3)
f ′(s2i + s¯
2
i )− βs1i − c ≤ 0. (3.4)
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Figure 3.1: The set S˜, for f(x) = 2 log(x+ 1), c = 1, and β = 1
2
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Otherwise, agent i would increase investment in any layer where marginal payoff is pos-
itive. Further, we may assume that Equations (3.3) and (3.4) hold with strict equality
whenever i makes positive investments in layers g1 or g2, respectively, and thus both
equations must hold with strict equality in the case of an interior solution—when i is a
dual-actor. Assumption 3.1 guarantees that the boundaries of inequalities (3.3) and (3.4)
will intersect at most once. The feasible set, S˜, is the set constrained by inequalities (3.3)
and (3.4) along with s1i ≤ sˆs and s2i ≤ sˆs, as shown in Figure 3.1.
Characterisation of equilibrium
To fully describe the equilibrium actions of a single agent, we take an arbitrary agent i
in a network (N, g) and let p ∈ {1, 2} be the layer in which local investment for agent i is
weakly lesser, and q the other layer. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. Let i be an agent in the network (N, g), and let s¯pi ≤ s¯qi for p, q ∈ {1, 2},
p 6= q. Assume that Assumption 3.1 holds. The following four conditions must all be met
in equilibrium:
1. If s¯pi ≥ sˆs, then i will be a free-rider and make investment si = (0, 0).
2. If s¯pi < sˆs and sˆs − s¯pi ≥ f
′(s¯qi )−c
β
, then i will be a single-actor and make investments
spi = sˆs − s¯pi and sqi = 0.
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3. If s¯pi = s¯
q
i < sˆs, then i will make investment si = (s˜i, s˜i), where
f ′(s˜i + s¯1i )− βs˜i − c = 0.
4. Otherwise, i’s unique optimal investment must involve investment in both layers.
Using Proposition 3.1 we may classify how any agent must act in a specialised equi-
librium. Any free-rider will invest (0, 0), and must have local investment weakly greater
than sˆs in each layer. A single-actor will invest sˆs in the layer in which no neighbours are
investing, and must be connected to at least one investing agent in the other layer. Finally,
if an agent is connected to no investors in either layer then they must be a dual-actor,
making investment (sˆd, sˆd), where f
′(sˆd)− βsˆd − c = 0.
3.3.2 Welfare properties
The first measure of welfare we will use is the aggregate payoff of all agents, which is
defined as
W (s | g) =
∑
i∈N
[
f
(
s1i + s¯
1
i
)− cs1i + f (s2i + s¯2i )− cs2i − βs1i s2i ] (3.5)
An equilibrium profile s is efficient if there is no other action profile that strictly increases
welfare. That is, there is no s′ ∈ Sn such that W (s′ | g) > W (s | g). As well, we will
analyse the distribution of payoffs within a population, under the assumption that a
narrower distribution is more equitable. A key measure we will use is the minimal payoff
to any agent in equilibrium.
First, we consider aggregate payoffs in a network, and determine how equilibrium
decisions relate to efficiency. There are two elements of an individual agent’s self-interested
decision making that may create a divergence from efficient outcomes. The first, where
an agent underinvests relative to an efficient level in each layer, parallels the discussion of
disjoint layers. The second relates to an agent’s layer choice, and how this affects other
agents.
Within each layer, all agents in an efficient profile who are making a positive investment
must invest such that ∂W (s|g)
∂spi
= 0, which implies that
f ′
(
spi + s¯
p
i
)− βsqi + ∑
j∈Ni(gp)
f ′
(
spj + s¯
p
j
)
− c = 0. (3.6)
where gp is the layer in which i is investing and gq is the other layer. However, in equi-
librium, f ′
(
spi + s¯
p
i
)− βsqi − c = 0 for any i investing in layer gp, and because f ′(·) > 0,
the term
∑
j∈Ni(gp) f
′
(
spj + s¯
p
j
)
must be strictly positive. This guarantees that any agent
who invests in equilibrium will always underinvest relative to an efficient level.
In any layer of a specialised equilibrium, only non-investors may have links to investing
agents, meaning the payoffs for single-actors and dual-actors are fixed. From each layer,
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a dual-actor will receive payoff f(sˆd)− csˆd − 12βsˆ2d. A single-actor receives f(sˆs)− csˆs
from the layer in which they are investing, and at least f(sˆd) from the other layer. A
free-rider must have local investment of at least sˆs in each layer, otherwise they would
invest themselves, which ensures that the payoff that a free-rider receives from each layer
is at least f(sˆs). This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. In any specialist equilibrium on the network (N, g), all dual-actors will
receive payoff less than that of any other agent.
In Section 3.3.3 we examine the parameter values for which dual-actors may exist
in equilibrium, concluding that parameterisations that exclude dual-actors will in turn
prevent the most unequal equilibria from occurring.
3.3.3 Comparative statics
We compare the strategic implications and welfare effects of changing two variables, β
and g. This is measured according to second-best equilibrium profiles; an equilibrium s∗ is
second-best if and only if there is no other equilibrium s∗′ such thatW (s∗′ | g) > W (s∗ | g).
As β increases, it has multiple effects on an agent’s ability to profitably invest in both
layers concurrently. Directly, β affects the benefit from an agent’s investments, so when β
rises an agent investing in both goods will see their absolute and marginal costs increase.
Holding actions constant, any agent investing in both goods will have a strictly lower
payoff.
A secondary effect of an increase in β is that it expands the opportunity for agents
contributing in one layer to avoid contribution in the other layer. For an agent i who
makes an investment in layer gp to not invest in gq, his local investment in gq, s¯qi , must be
sufficiently high that marginal return from any new investment will not exceed marginal
costs, as is set out in Lemma C.3. When β increases, these marginal costs will increase,
and the threshold level of local investment required to sustain a non-investment for i in
gq falls, expanding i’s ability to free-ride in that layer.
Figure 3.2 illustrates this effect. We assume that for some agent i, s¯pi < s¯
q
i ; thus, if
i’s equilibrium investment is in a single layer, i’s investment will be spi = sˆs − s¯pi in layer
gp. Then the optimal local investment for i in layer gq is s˜, where f ′(s˜) = c+ βspi . For
any level of local investment above s˜, i will not invest in layer gq in equilibrium, whereas
if local investment is below s˜ then i must be a dual-actor, as set out in Proposition 3.1,
statement 2. As β increases, s˜ decreases, which increases the range of local investment in
layer gq for which i’s equilibrium action is to invest in a single layer.
If s∗ is a second-best equilibrium profile on the network (N, g), then the
addition of the link gpij may have three effects. If both s
p
i
∗ = 0 and spj
∗ = 0 then
W (s∗ | g + gpij) = W (s∗ | g). s∗ is still an equilibrium profile which yields the same
welfare, and there may be another equilibrium profile where either or both of
spi > 0 and s
p
j > 0 which yields higher welfare. If either s
p
i
∗ > 0 or spj
∗ > 0, then
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Figure 3.2: Benefit from investment
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W (s∗ | g + gpij) > W (s∗ | g). s∗ remains an equilibrium profile, and the new link passes
additional benefit to a new node; thus second-best equilibrium in the new network must
be strictly higher.
The final effect is where partial substitutes differ most from the case of disjoint layers.
Suppose that both spi
∗ > 0 and spj
∗ > 0. Then, s∗ is no longer an equilibrium in the
network (N, g + gpij), and second-best welfare may increase or decrease. Holding initial
investments constant, after i and j are linked in layer gp, benefits will increase for both
agents while costs will remain constant. However, because marginal benefit in layer gp
will decrease for both agents, it will no longer be an equilibrium and at least one of the
agents will decrease their investment. Knock-on effects will be multiple: supposing agent
j reduces spj , j’s marginal cost in layer g
q, c+ βspj , will fall, and j may also increase sjq in
equilibria. As well, the initial decreases in spj will result in the marginal benefit increasing
for all k ∈ Nj(gp), and these agents may then increase their investment in gp. As these
actions may effect aggregate payoff both positively or negatively, the effect of the new
link gpij is indeterminate.
The following examples shows both consequences of an additional link.
Example 3.1 (Negative Effect). Consider the three-agent networks in Figure 3.3. We
continue to use the model with f(x) = 2 log(x+ 1), β = 1
2
, and c = 1. The initial network
is shown in Figure 3.3a, along with each agent’s investment in the second-best equilibrium,
for which aggregate payoff is approximately 5.318. Note that in g1, all investment is borne
by the most central agent, 1, which would be the second-best equilibrium if the two layers
were independent.
In Figure 3.3b, a link has been added between agents 2 and 3 in layer g2. While both
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Figure 3.3: New link with a negative effect
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Figure 3.4: New link with a positive effect
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agents had been investing before in Figure 3.3a, due to the new link they must in aggregate
invest less in g2. This, in turn, prevents agent 1 from free-riding in g2, and 1 can’t bear
all of the investment in g1. In the second-best equilibrium, which is shown in Figure 3.3b,
the new link in layer g2 results in a considerably worse aggregate outcome in layer g1,
and the total aggregate payoff is approximately 5.037. Aggregate payoff in the second-best
equilibrium has fallen by about 0.2808.
Example 3.2 (Positive Effect). Consider the three-agent networks in Figure 3.4, and
the model with f(x) = 2 log(x+ 1), β = 1
2
, and c = 1. The initial network is shown in
Figure 3.4a, along with each agent’s investment in the second-best equilibrium, which has
aggregate payoff of approximately 3.057. Because there are no links in layer g2, all agents
must invest in this layer in any equilibrium, and they are less able to invest in layer g1
where any investment is shared.
In Figure 3.4, a link has been added between agents 1 and 2 in layer g2. Then, agents
1 and 2 must reduce their aggregate investment in g2, which will benefit both agents. In
the second-best equilibrium shown, agent 1 can free-ride off of agent 2’s investment in
g2, freeing up agent 1 to invest a greater amount in layer g1 to the benefit of all agents.
Aggregate payoff is approximately 5.318, and the improvement in the aggregate payoff in
second-best equilibrium is approximately 2.261.
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3.3.4 Stability of equilibrium
An equilibrium is stable if, after a sufficiently small perturbation of the equilibrium in-
vestment profile, a series of myopic best responses by each agent will converge back to
equilibrium. Agent i’s best response to the profile of all other agents’ investments is
defined
ri(s−i | g) = arg max
si
{Πi(si, s−i | g)}. (3.7)
The profile of all agents’ best responses is determined by r(s | g) : Sn → Sn. Define the
series rt(s | g) = r(rt−1(s | g) | g) with r0(s | g) = s. Then, the equilibrium s∗ is stable
if there exists some ρ > 0 such that, for any  ∈ Rn×2+ with
∣∣pi ∣∣ < ρ and spi ∗ + pi ≥ 0,
∀ i ∈ N , ∀ p ∈ {1, 2}, limt→∞ rt(s∗ + ) = s∗.
Let s∗ be an equilibrium, and suppose i is an intermediate investor in layer gp. Then if
i’s neighbour in gp increases his investment, i’s best response may either be to decrease his
investment in g1 or to change his layer choice. When a permutation of equilibrium is such
that investments all weakly increase in one layer, in the first step of myopic best responses
all investments in the same layer will be weakly lower, while all investments in the opposite
layer will be weakly higher. In every step, this pattern will reverse, and this oscillating
pattern is key in demonstrating that any equilibrium with intermediate investments may
be permuted in such a manner that a sequence of best responses will never converge to the
original equilibrium, ensuring a stable equilibrium must be specialised. This is essential
in proving the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. Assume Assumption 3.1 holds. An equilibrium is stable if and only if the
set of agents N can be partitioned into four disjoint sets, L, I1, I2, and D, where
1. ∀ p ∈ {1, 2}, D ∪ Ip is a maximal independent set in layer gp, and
2. ∀ ` ∈ L and ∀ p ∈ {1, 2}, ` is linked in layer gp to either
(a) more than sˆs
sˆd
agents in set D, or
(b) at least one agent in Ip and more than one agent in D ∪ Ip,
and the actions of all agents are as follows: sd = (sˆd, sˆd) ∀ d ∈ D,
si1 = (sˆs, 0) ∀ i1 ∈ I1, si2 = (0, sˆs) ∀ i2 ∈ I2, and s` = (0, 0) ∀ ` ∈ L.
As the value of β increases, sˆd decreases because f
′(sˆd)− βsˆd − c = 0. With sˆs fixed,
the ratio sˆs
sˆd
then increases as β increases. As a result, as the value of β rises, Theorem 3.2
condition 2a indicates that, if a free-rider is not free-riding from at least one single-actor,
the number of dual-actors they must be connected to will rise. Ultimately, distraction
may have two effects on stable equilibria: the payoff for dual-actors and their neighbours
will fall as the level of distraction rises, when actions remain constant, but a higher level
of distraction may preclude equilibria that feature agents free-riding off of dual-actors,
which will increase equity and may increase aggregate payoff, as the following example
illustrates.
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Figure 3.5: Stable Equilibria
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Example 3.3. Let n = 4, f(x) = 2 log(x+ 1) and c = 1, so that
Πi(s | g) = 2 log
s1i + ∑
j∈Ni(g1)
s1j + 1
− s1i
+ 2 log
s2i + ∑
j∈Ni(g2)
s2j + 1
− s2i − βs1i s2i , (3.8)
and assume that the network is a star in each layer, with the same central agent in both
layers. Then sˆs = 1 and sˆd =
√
1+6β+β2−(1+β)
2β
, which is decreasing in β. When β = 0, the
only stable equilibrium is depicted in Figure 3.5a. In this equilibrium, the central agent
receives Π1 ≈ 5.54, the peripheral agents (agents 2–4) receive Π−1 ≈ 0.77, and aggregate
payoff is W ≈ 7.86. Figure 3.5b depicts the equivalent stable equilibrium when β is less
than 3
2
. Now Π1 = 4 log(3sˆd + 1) and Π−1 = 4 log(sˆd + 1)− 2sˆd. As there is no change in
strategy apart from reducing investment, distraction makes all agents worse off. However,
for values of β above this range, equilibrium 3.5b cannot persist, as the central agent’s
local investment is insufficient to support free-riding. Then, the equilibrium in Figure 3.5c,
which is stable for all β > 0, is the only stable equilibrium. In this equilibrium, Π1 ≈ 3.16,
Π−1 ≈ 1.77, and W ≈ 8.48. Because distraction forces agents into a different set of in-
vestments versus when layers are disjoint, distraction increases aggregate payoff and the
distribution of payoffs is more equitable.
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3.4 Discussion
In each layer, agents who contribute receive lower payoffs than those who do not, which
is why dual-actors must be the least well off of all agents. Holding investments fixed,
increasing distraction will penalise dual-actors further. However, we’ve shown that, as
distraction increases, the minimal payoff for any agent in a network will eventually become
higher when dual-action becomes unsustainable. In essence, being the lowliest agent
becomes so unpalatable that these agents are forced to stop allowing their neighbours to
profit at their expense in both layers, and, where possible, other agents will take their
place and become investors.
When distraction rises, dual-actors gain a comparative strategic advantage over their
free-riding neighbours. Because a dual-actor is distracted, the marginal benefit they
receive from investing is lower. When agents have different marginal benefits in one layer,
the game becomes similar in character to Allouch’s (2015) local public good game with
heterogeneous wealth. There, wealthier agents have greater marginal benefit from public
investment, and in each local neighbourhood the wealthiest agents invest to the benefit
of their poorer neighbours. In our model, after fixing the investments of all agents in one
layer, agents will have heterogeneous payoff functions from investment in the other layer.
Gagnon and Goyal’s (2017) model provides similar lessons in comparative advantages
within networks. Agents have a binary market action that provides a fixed payoff to all,
and a binary network action with increasing benefit as the number of neighbours taking
this action rises. In the case of strategic substitutes, taking the market action reduces the
rate at which network benefits increase. In this case, highly connected agents who are
connected primarily to highly connected agents, those who are benefitting most from the
network action, may choose not to take the market action, as it will reduce their network
benefits. Less connected agents will have less to lose and will select the market action,
and thus the market action serves to decrease inequality. In our model, the connected
actions are both network actions, but benefitting from one action (or non-action) may
still create disadvantages in the other network, leading to similar effects.
3.5 Extensions
Because strategic network effects are substitutes, actions tend to separate. As more
agents invest in one layer, the marginal payoff to any agent investing in that layer weakly
decreases. This, in effect, limits the amount of investment that any layer will receive.
In contrast, some networks may feature complementary network effects. Then, as more
agents invest in a layer, marginal payoff to agents investing in that layer will weakly
increase, which may further draw agents to invest in that layer. We could see a pool-
ing effect, as agents might coordinate and only invest in complementary layers when a
sufficient number of their neighbours are doing so as well.
To allow for a more robust set of potential inter- and intra-agent interactions, we must
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find a simpler model. Chen et al. (2018) model socially connected criminals who engage
in a second network activity, and we use their model as a starting point. Here, an agent’s
payoff is modelled according to the payoff function
Πi(s | g) = α1s1i + α2s2i −
[
1
2
(
s1i
)2
+
1
2
(
s2i
)2
+ βs1i s
2
i
]
+ δ
∑
j∈Ni(g)
(
s1i s
1
j + s
2
i s
2
j
)
. (3.9)
The parameter β ∈ (−1, 1) describes the nature of intra-agent strategic interactions, and
the parameter δ > 0 ensures that inter-agent strategic interactions are complements. We
extend the model in such a manner that each action has its own layer of the network as
follows:
Πi(s | g) = α1s1i−
1
2
(
s1i
)2
+βs1i s
2
i +α
2s2i−
1
2
(
s2i
)2
+δ1
∑
j∈Ni(g1)
s1i s
1
j +δ
2
∑
j∈Ni(g2)
s2i s
2
j . (3.10)
Let Γ(N,S, g) denote the game on network (N, g) with action set Sn and this payoff
function. Note that ∂
2Πi(s|g)
∂s1i ∂s
2
i
= β, and so β ∈ (−1, 1) determines the nature of intra-agent
strategic interactions. For β > 0 an agent’s two actions are strategic complements, and
β < 0 implies that an agent’s two actions are strategic substitutes. Because ∂
2Πi(s|g)
∂spi ∂s
p
j
= δp,
strategic interactions on the layer gp are determined by the parameter δp ∈ (−1, 1), with
δp > 0 implying that actions on that layer are strategic complements and δp < 0 describing
actions which are strategic substitutes. In an extension, Chen et al. (2018) describe how
their model may be extended to a multi-layer framework and provide existence results.
Our use of this model goes beyond these results in allowing for strategic substitutes on
networks and allowing for the action set to be bounded, for instance, enforcing that all
actions must be positive.
Bramoulle´, Kranton and D’Amours (2014) demonstrate how this new model can in-
corporate their public good model in Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007), and we apply a
similar extension to the main model in this paper. Taking β = 0, then in each layer
∂Πi(s|g)
∂spi
= αp − spi + δps¯pi . Setting marginal payoff equal to zero, excluding where invest-
ment is bound to be positive, implies that ri(s | g) = max
{
0, αp − δps¯pi
}
. Setting αp = sˆs
and δp = 1, this is identical to the best-reply function in our main model when β = 0.
Since agents in both models have identical best-reply functions, they must have identical
sets of Nash equilibria.
To ensure the tractability of this new model, we first establish that Γ(N,S, g) is a
potential game (see Monderer and Shapley 1996). In a potential game, there exists a
potential function φ such that, for all si, s
′
i ∈ S and s−i ∈ Sn−1,
φ(si, s−i)− φ(s′i, s−i) = Πi(si, s−i | g)− Πi(s′i, s−i | g). (3.11)
For a potential game, the set of Nash equilibria is isomorphic to the set of maxima and
saddle points of the potential function.
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Redefining s to be the vector (s11, . . . , sn1, s12, . . . , sn2)
T we propose the following.
Proposition 3.3. The function
φ(s) =
(
α11
α21
)T
s− 1
2
sT
I − [δ1G1 βI
βI δ2G2
] s (3.12)
is a potential function for the game Γ(N,S, g).
By determining the parameters under which the potential function is uniquely concave,
we can then prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3. Let
υp =
δ
pλmax(G
p) if δp > 0
δpλmin(G
p) if δp < 0.
(3.13)
If
(1− υ1) > 0 and (3.14)
β2 < (1− υ1)(1− υ2) (3.15)
then the game Γ(N,S, g) has a unique equilibrium on the action space S.
This result is consistent with Chen et al. (2018, Theorem 6), which shows that when
δ1 > 0, δ2 > 0, and S = R2, then min{(1− υ1), (1− υ2)} > |β| implies that there is a
unique equilibrium. Our result allows for a more general parameter space, the ability to
restrict the action space, and expands the threshold for which a unique equilibrium must
exist.
3.6 Conclusion
Individuals and firms face choices in how to allocate their resources across existing oppor-
tunities. If our neighbour is willing to contribute her own resources towards our shared
benefit, we may invest our own resources elsewhere and exploit our neighbour’s gener-
osity. Such strategic incentive to exploit neighbours may lead to outcomes where some
people contribute and others free-ride. We explore these incentives in the context of in-
novation, where firms have opportunity to invest in researching two different technologies,
and research achievements are shared with neighbouring firms.
In our model a group of agents is connected by two distinct sets of links, with each
set describing pairs of agents who share benefit from investment in two different local
public goods. Marginal benefit is declining in local investment, so agents have incentive
to reduce investment when neighbours’ investments increase, and inter-agent investments
are strategic substitutes. When an agent invests in both goods, the cost of each investment
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increases, and intra-agent investments are strategic substitutes. We have shown how an
increase in an agent’s costs can be beneficial: when agent i’s return on investment is
greater than that of his neighbour j, because j is investing in the other technology, it may
ensure that in equilibrium i will invest and j will benefit.
Our model provides a framework to analyse how investments in one good affect in-
vestments in the other, and to understand the resulting distribution of payoffs across the
population. From each good, non-investing agents always receive higher payoff than in-
vestors, and payoff is decreasing in the level of investment. However, because investment
in one good reduces the profitability of investment in the other, combining two networks
and two public goods may have a tendency to balance payoffs between the two goods and
increase equity. As the cost of investing in both goods increases, the conditions under
which a single agent may invest in both goods cease to exist, and as a result the minimal
achievable payoff in equilibrium increases.
To conclude, we will acknowledge some of our model’s limitations and remark on po-
tential areas for extension. Agents and public goods are heterogeneous only in linking
structure. A more robust model might include heterogeneous wealth; and, if wealthier
agents have a higher propensity to invest in the public good, this could overwhelm the
strategic effects of investment. While assigning the same payoff function to each network
ensures that the results reflect differences in linking structure, if each network had a differ-
ent payoff function we might determine how different strategic affects cause agents to act.
Because inter-agent actions are strategic substitutes, an agent’s neighbours’ investments
push that agent towards investment in the other network; but, if actions are complements
we might see agents with incentive to pool investments together in one of the networks.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.1. Suppose the society is in state µ = (1, 0, 0). Then, µw = 0 im-
plies that
uh(µ) = v
(
1− φ(µw)
)
(A.1)
= v
(
1− φ(0)) (A.2)
= v(1− 0) (A.3)
= v. (A.4)
Then by Assumption 1.1,
uh(µ) > ` (A.5)
≥ `− t (A.6)
= uf (µ). (A.7)
Similarly, µw = 0 implies that
uw(µ) = t
µf
µw
(A.8)
= t
0
µw
(A.9)
= 0 (A.10)
< uh(µ). (A.11)
Because uh(µ) > uf (µ) and uh(µ) > uw(µ), state vector µ describes and equilibrium.
Aggregate welfare is equal to µhv + µf`− µhvφ(µw). Because v > `, µ must maximise
aggregate payoff.
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Proof of Proposition 1.2. Assume that ∃ t ∈ [0, `] such that
vφ
(
t
`
)
− t ≥ v − `, (A.12)
and pick any t for which this is true. Set µ =
(
0, `−t
`
, t
`
)
. Then
uw(µ) = t
µf
µw
(A.13)
= t
`−t
`
t
`
(A.14)
= `− t (A.15)
= uf (µ). (A.16)
Also,
uf (µ)− uh(µ) = `− t− v
(
1− φ(µw)
)
(A.17)
= `− t− v
(
1− φ
(
t
`
))
(A.18)
=
(
vφ
(
t
`
)
− t
)
− (v − `) (A.19)
≥ 0, (A.20)
according to Equation (A.12). Because uf (µ) = uw(µ) and uf (µ) > uh(µ), state vector
µ describes an equilibrium.
Conversely, suppose there is some vector µ = (0, 1− α, α) that describes an equilib-
rium for some t such that
vφ
(
t
`
)
− t < v − `. (A.21)
Then,
uf (µ) = uw(µ) =⇒ `− t = t1− α
α
(A.22)
=⇒ α = t
`
. (A.23)
Then,
vφ
(
t
`
)
− t < v − ` =⇒ `− t < v
(
1− φ
(
t
`
))
(A.24)
=⇒ µf (µ) < µw(µ), (A.25)
which is a contradiction. Thus, if Equation (A.21) is true there cannot be an equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 1.3. Recall from Equation (1.18) that U(µ) = µhv + µf`− vµhφ(µw).
For v > `, the µ ∈ ∆2 that maximises U(µ) is µ = (1, 0, 0).
Proof of Proposition 1.4. From Equation (1.26),
dfτ = λ(1− µ∗w − fτ ) dτ. (A.26)
In function notation, this is
f ′(τ) = λ
(
1− µ∗w − f(τ)
)
. (A.27)
We also have a fixed point for the function f(τ),
f(0) = 0. (A.28)
The function that satisfies Equations (A.27) and (A.28) is
f(τ) = (1− µ∗w)
(
1− e−λτ
)
. (A.29)
Then,
Ue =
∞∫
0
ue(µτ ) e
−δτdτ (A.30)
=
∞∫
0
uw
(
µµ∗w
) f(τ)
1− µ∗w
e−δτdτ (A.31)
=
∞∫
0
uw
(
µµ∗w
) (1− µ∗w)(1− e−λτ)
1− µ∗w
e−δτdτ (A.32)
= uw
(
µµ∗w
) ∞∫
0
e−δτ − e−(λ+δ)τdτ (A.33)
= uw
(
µµ∗w
)(1
δ
− 1
λ+ δ
)∣∣∣∣∣
∞
0
(A.34)
= uw
(
µµ∗w
) λ
δ(λ+ δ)
. (A.35)
58 APPENDIX A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
Agent e will create a warrior elite if and only if
Ue > v (A.36)
uw
(
µµ∗w
) λ
δ(λ+ δ)
> v (A.37)
λ >
δ2v
uw
(
µµ∗w
)− δv . (A.38)
Proof of Proposition 1.5. We prove each statement separately.
1. Suppose that φg permits an agricultural equilibrium, and that
φ`(x) ≥ φg(x) ∀ x ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose that µ describes an agricultural equilibrium
using technology of violence φg, where µh = 0. Neither uf (µ) nor uw(µ) make use
of the technology of violence, so the utility received by type-θf or type-θw agents is
the same under either φ` or φg.
Now, because φ`(x) ≥ φg(x) ∀ x ∈ [0, 1],
v
(
1− φ`(µw)
) ≤ v(1− φg(µw)) , (A.39)
and, for vector µ, the utility for type-θh agents is lower using φ` than when using
φg. Because we have assumed that µ describes an agricultural equilibrium using
φg, it must be the case that uf (µ) ≥ uh(µ) and uw(µ) ≥ uh(µ) using φg, and by
Equation (A.39) these conditions will still hold using φ`. Then, µ must also describe
an agricultural equilibrium using φ`.
2. Suppose that φg does not permit an agricultural equilibrium, and that
φ`(x) ≤ φg(x) ∀ x ∈ [0, 1].
Suppose that µ describes an agricultural equilibrium using technology of violence
φ`, where µh = 0. Neither uf (µ) nor uw(µ) make use of the technology of violence,
so the utility received by type-θf or type-θw agents is the same under either φ` or
φg.
Now, because φ`(x) ≤ φg(x) ∀ x ∈ [0, 1],
v
(
1− φ`(µw)
) ≥ v(1− φg(µw)) , (A.40)
and, for vector µ, the utility for type-θh agents is lower using φg than when using
φ`. Because we have assumed that µ describes an agricultural equilibrium using
φ`, it must be the case that uf (µ) ≥ uh(µ) and uw(µ) ≥ uh(µ) using φ`, and by
Equation (A.40) these conditions will still hold using φg. But, then, µ must also de-
scribe an agricultural equilibrium using φg, which contradicts are initial supposition.
Therefore, we may conclude that φ` may not permit an agricultural equilibrium.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Definition of Matrices from Proposition 2.2
In this section, we define the matrices that are described in Proposition 2.2. For ease of
explanation, we will describe how each matrix is constructed in reference to the network
gs from Figure 2.2 (reproduced in Figure B.1).
From Example 2.1, the inverse demand in tier 1 is
p1 = 12 −X1q1, (B.1)
where
X1 =
(
2 1
1 2
)
. (B.2)
We are defining the matrices U2, D2, and F2 such that
p2 = 12 − 2
[
U2
(
D2X1D
T
2 ◦ F2
)−1
UT2
]−1
q2. (B.3)
First, index the links from tier 2 to tier 1. The ordering may be arbitrary, but by
convention we will order the links sequentially: first by tail, then by head. For example,
the vector of links is defined
q2,1 =
q21,11q21,12
q22,12
 , (B.4)
such that q21,11 is link 1, q21,12 is link 2, and q22,12 is link 3. We take the indexing of nodes
in tiers 1 and 2 as their sequential ordering in their respective tiers.
The matrix D2 is defined such that
dij =
1 if the i
th link corresponds with the jth node in tier 1, and
0 otherwise.
(B.5)
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Figure B.1: The network gs
s
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<latexit sha1_base64="6Vea 9sE0sMPXFdgjYKKsUklj2nE=">AAAB83icbVC7SgNBFJ2NrxhfUR vBZjAIsQm7EdHOgI1lBPOA7BJmJ7PJkHksM7NCWPY3bCwUsbDxJ /wEO7/ArxCcPApNPHDhcM693HtPGDOqjet+Orml5ZXVtfx6YWNza 3unuLvX1DJRmDSwZFK1Q6QJo4I0DDWMtGNFEA8ZaYXDq7HfuiNK UyluzSgmAUd9QSOKkbGS75dT2k29apb5J91iya24E8BF4s1I6fL7 XX4dvPJ6t/jh9yROOBEGM6R1x3NjE6RIGYoZyQp+okmM8BD1Scd SgTjRQTq5OYPHVunBSCpbwsCJ+nsiRVzrEQ9tJ0dmoOe9sfif10 lMdBGkVMSJIQJPF0UJg0bCcQCwRxXBho0sQVhReyvEA6QQNjamgg 3Bm395kTSrFe+0cnbjlmplMEUeHIIjUAYeOAc1cA3qoAEwiME9e ARPTuI8OM/Oy7Q158xm9sEfOG8/LtqVgA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="6Vea 9sE0sMPXFdgjYKKsUklj2nE=">AAAB83icbVC7SgNBFJ2NrxhfUR vBZjAIsQm7EdHOgI1lBPOA7BJmJ7PJkHksM7NCWPY3bCwUsbDxJ /wEO7/ArxCcPApNPHDhcM693HtPGDOqjet+Orml5ZXVtfx6YWNza 3unuLvX1DJRmDSwZFK1Q6QJo4I0DDWMtGNFEA8ZaYXDq7HfuiNK UyluzSgmAUd9QSOKkbGS75dT2k29apb5J91iya24E8BF4s1I6fL7 XX4dvPJ6t/jh9yROOBEGM6R1x3NjE6RIGYoZyQp+okmM8BD1Scd SgTjRQTq5OYPHVunBSCpbwsCJ+nsiRVzrEQ9tJ0dmoOe9sfif10 lMdBGkVMSJIQJPF0UJg0bCcQCwRxXBho0sQVhReyvEA6QQNjamgg 3Bm395kTSrFe+0cnbjlmplMEUeHIIjUAYeOAc1cA3qoAEwiME9e ARPTuI8OM/Oy7Q158xm9sEfOG8/LtqVgA==</latexit>
t
<latexit sha1_base64="pObh S+0tQZe4adDrcHWtorcxTN8=">AAAB7nicbZC7SgNBFIbPeo3xFr UUZDEIsQm7imhnwMYyAXOBZAmzk9lkyOzsMnNWCEtKH8DGQhFbK+ s8h53P4Es4uRSa+MPAx/+fw5xz/FhwjY7zZS0tr6yurWc2sptb2 zu7ub39mo4SRVmVRiJSDZ9oJrhkVeQoWCNWjIS+YHW/fzPO6/dMa R7JOxzEzAtJV/KAU4LGqrcKKQ5bp+1c3ik6E9mL4M4gf/0xqnw/ HI3K7dxnqxPRJGQSqSBaN10nRi8lCjkVbJhtJZrFhPZJlzUNShIy 7aWTcYf2iXE6dhAp8yTaE/d3R0pCrQehbypDgj09n43N/7JmgsGV l3IZJ8gknX4UJMLGyB7vbne4YhTFwAChiptZbdojilA0F8qaI7j zKy9C7azonhcvKk6+VICpMnAIx1AAFy6hBLdQhipQ6MMjPMOLFVt P1qv1Ni1dsmY9B/BH1vsPeveTWg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="pObh S+0tQZe4adDrcHWtorcxTN8=">AAAB7nicbZC7SgNBFIbPeo3xFr UUZDEIsQm7imhnwMYyAXOBZAmzk9lkyOzsMnNWCEtKH8DGQhFbK+ s8h53P4Es4uRSa+MPAx/+fw5xz/FhwjY7zZS0tr6yurWc2sptb2 zu7ub39mo4SRVmVRiJSDZ9oJrhkVeQoWCNWjIS+YHW/fzPO6/dMa R7JOxzEzAtJV/KAU4LGqrcKKQ5bp+1c3ik6E9mL4M4gf/0xqnw/ HI3K7dxnqxPRJGQSqSBaN10nRi8lCjkVbJhtJZrFhPZJlzUNShIy 7aWTcYf2iXE6dhAp8yTaE/d3R0pCrQehbypDgj09n43N/7JmgsGV l3IZJ8gknX4UJMLGyB7vbne4YhTFwAChiptZbdojilA0F8qaI7j zKy9C7azonhcvKk6+VICpMnAIx1AAFy6hBLdQhipQ6MMjPMOLFVt P1qv1Ni1dsmY9B/BH1vsPeveTWg==</latexit>
For instance, in network gs
D2 =
1 00 1
0 1
 . (B.6)
For interpretation, we have defined D2 such that p2,1 = D2p1 is the vector of prices
indexed by the link ordering in q2,1.
In a similar manner we define U2 such that
uij =
1 if the j
th link corresponds with the ith node in tier 2, and
0 otherwise.
(B.7)
For instance, in network gs
U2 =
(
1 1 0
0 0 1
)
. (B.8)
For interpretation, we have defined U2 such that, given the quantities sold along each link
in q2,1, we may calculate the quantities at each node in tier 2 according to q2 = U2q2,1.
The matrix F2 is defined such that
fij =

1 if the ith link and the jth link have the same tail in tier 2, and
1
2
otherwise.
(B.9)
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For instance, in network gs
F2 =
1 1
1
2
1 1 1
2
1
2
1
2
1
 . (B.10)
F2 relates to how intermediaries make their decisions. When two links share a tail, profits
along each link flow to a single intermediary. Thus, he must take into account how his
decision along one link affects his profit along another link. When intermediaries maximise
profit in each stage, adjusting by the Hadamard product using F2 converts the total profit
function to a potential function.
Given, D2, U2, and F2, define
X2 = 2
[
U2
(
D2X1D
T
2 ◦ F2
)−1
UT2
]−1
(B.11)
=
(
3 3
2
3
2
15
4
)
. (B.12)
and Equation (B.3) becomes
p2 = 12 −X2q2. (B.13)
The matrix A2, defined in Corollary 2.1, is
A2 =
1
2
X2U2
(
D2X1D
T
2 ◦ FT2
)−1
. (B.14)
In the network gs,
A2 =
(
1
2
1
2
0
1
4
−1
4
1
)
. (B.15)
A2 is the allocation matrix. Assuming that the quantities of good arriving in tier 2 are
fixed and given by q2, then profit maximising intermediaries will allocate their quantities
of good along each link according to q2,1 = A
T
2q2.
B.1.1 Solving the Model
If there were additional tiers above tier 2, we would then solve for X3 as a function of
X2, and then recursively solve until we have found Xx ∀ x ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. However, since
tier 2 receives its good directly from the source, we instead assume that p2 = 02 and
rearranging Equation (B.13) yields
q2 = X
−1
2 12 (B.16)
=
(
1
4
1
6
)
. (B.17)
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Table B.1: Equilibrium quantities, prices, and profits for network gs
Node Quantity Price Profit
i11 0.1667 0.4167 0.0278
i12 0.25 0.3333 0.0625
i21 0.25 0 0.0972
i22 0.1667 0 0.0556
t 0.4167 0.5833 CS = 0.0868
Then,
q1 = D
T
2A
T
2q2 (B.18)
=
(
1
6
1
4
)
. (B.19)
Equations (B.1) and (B.13) give us the pricing at each node, and using quantities and
prices we may easily calculate each intermediary’s profit. The solution for network gs is
presented in Table B.1.
Using the matrices defined in Appendix B.1, we obtain the same equilibrium quantities,
prices, and profits as we did in Example 2.1.
B.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1. The proof proceeds by contradiction. The price paid by any
intermediary i ∈ I is equal to their marginal revenue from qi. Supposing
∑
j∈N+i (g) qi,j < qi,
then i’s marginal revenue from qi is zero, and therefore pi = 0. But then there could be
no intermediary k ∈ N−i (g) for whom qk,i > 0, implying that qi = 0. This contradicts the
original supposition that
∑
j∈N+i (g) qi,j < qi.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Consider two tiers, x− 1 and x, with |Ix−1| = ` and |Ix| = k.
Assume as well that there exists an `× ` matrix Xx−1 such that px−1 = 1` −Xx−1qx−1
is the inverse demand function in tier x− 1. Taking matrices Ux, Dx, and Fx as defined
in Appendix B.1. We will show that
px = 1k −Xxqx, (B.20)
where
Xx = 2
[
Ux
(
DxXx−1DTx ◦ Fx
)−1
UTx
]−1
, (B.21)
is the inverse demand function in tier x.
Let r ∈ {min {k, `} , . . . , k`} be the number of links in Ex,x−1, and qx,x−1 be the vector
that describes the quantity of the good that flows along each link in Ex,x−1. The matrix
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Dx maps prices at each end-node in tier x− 1 to the links in Ex,x−1. The prices along
each link are described by
p−x,x−1 = Dxpx−1 (B.22)
= Dx (1` −Xx−1qx−1) (B.23)
= 1r −DxXx−1qx−1. (B.24)
The superscript ‘−’ denotes the fact that these are the prices at the head of each link,
whereas we would use a superscript ‘+’ to denote the price at the tail of a link. Substi-
tuting qx−1 = DTxqx,x−1 we get
p−x,x−1 = 1r −DxXx−1DTxqx,x−1. (B.25)
Now, given an allocation qx,x−1, the aggregate profit for all agents in tier x is
Πx(qx,x−1) = qTx,x−1p
−
x,x−1 − C(qx) (B.26)
= qTx,x−11r − qTx,x−1DxXx−1DTxqx,x−1 − C(qx), (B.27)
where C(qx) is the total amount paid for the good by agents in tier x.
We may subdivide the profit Πx(qx,x−1) along each link according to
Πx(qx,x−1) =
∑
e∈Ex,x−1 pie(qx,x−1). When an intermediary ixv ∈ Ix changes the
quantity qxv,(x−1)w—the amount of good that they are providing to intermediary
(x− 1)w ∈ Ix−1—the effect on total profit is
∂Πx(qx,x−1)
∂qxv,(x−1)w
=
∑
e∈Ex,x−1
∂pie(qx,x−1)
∂qxv,(x−1)w
. (B.28)
The effect on intermediary ixv’s individual profit is
∂pixv(qx,x−1)
∂qxv,(x−1)w
=
∑
e∈L−xv
∂pie(qx,x−1)
∂qxv,(x−1)w
, (B.29)
and the difference is
∂Πx(qx,x−1)
∂qxv,(x−1)w
− ∂pixv(qx,x−1)
∂qxv,(x−1)w
=
∑
e∈Ex,x−1\L−xv
∂pie(qx,x−1)
∂qxv,(x−1)w
. (B.30)
When ixv changes the amount of good provided to an arbitrary intermediary in
tier x− 1, the difference between the change in ixv’s profit and the total profit is the
change in profit along all edges that do not originate at ixv. We will create a potential
function by adjusting the profit function in such a way that the the profit along these edges
does not change when ixv changes his action (Monderer and Shapley 1996, introduces the
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concept of a potential game). The potential function required is
Φx(qx) = q
T
x1k −
(
ATxqx
)T[(
DxXx−1DTx
)
◦ Fx
]
ATxqx, (B.31)
which makes use of the allocation matrix defined in Appendix B.1 to convert from quant-
ities along each link to quantities at each node in Ix. We will solve for this allocation
matrix later.
Our argument that this is a potential function makes use of the following lemma.
Lemma B.1. ∀ x ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the matrix Xx is symmetric.
Proof. First, note that by construction Fx is symmetric ∀ x ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Also, it is easy
to show that X1 is always the symmetric matrix with 2s on the diagonal and 1s in every
other position. As well, recall three facts: for any symmetricH , W = ZHZT is symmet-
ric, the Hadamard product of any two symmetric matrices is symmetric, and the inverse
of an invertible symmetric matrix is symmetric. Because the recursive definition of Xx
with respect to Xx−1 only makes use of these three operations and scalar multiplication,
then Xx must be symmetric ∀ x.
As a result of Lemma B.1, we may conclude that the matrix DxXx−1DTx in Equa-
tion (B.27) is symmetric. This further ensures that for any two links e1, e2 ∈ Ex,x−1
∂pie1(qx,x−1)
∂qe2
=
∂pie2(qx,x−1)
∂qe1
. (B.32)
If e1 and e2 share the same tail, then the profit along each link belongs to a single
intermediary in Ix. The potential function must include the full effect of a change in qe1
or qe2 on the profit in each link. If they don’t share the same tail, then the cross effects
should be excluded. Due to the symmetry in Equation (B.32), this may be accomplished
by halving each of the e1, e2
th and e2, e1
th entries in DxXx−1DTx . This is precisely what
Hadamard multiplication by the matrix Fx accomplishes.
The final stage in the proof is to determine how the agents in Ix maximise their own
payoff, given the quantities provided to them by qx. The result of this section is presented
in Corollary 2.1.
Proof of Corollary 2.1. Each agent i ∈ Ix faces the simultaneous optimisation
problem:
maximize
qi,w ∀ w ∈ N−i (g)
pii(qj)
subject to
∑
w∈N−i (g)
qi,w ≤ qi,
(B.33)
which is equivalent to the global maximisation problem:
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maximize
qe ∀ e ∈ Ex,x−1
Φi(qj)
subject to
∑
w∈N−i (g)
qi,w ≤ qi ∀ i ∈ Ix.
(B.34)
We solve this problem using Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimisation. The Lagrangian for
the problem is
L(qx,x−1,µ) = Φi(qx) +
∑
i∈Ix
µi

 ∑
w∈N−i (g)
qi,w
− qi
 (B.35)
If we set the first order conditions with respect to each element of the vectors qx,x−1 and
µ to zero, the resulting system of equations is(
1k
−qx
)
−
((
DxXx−1DTx
) ◦ Fx UTx
Ux 0k×k
)(
qx,x−1
µ
)
= 0r+k. (B.36)((
DxXx−1DTx
) ◦ Fx UTx
Ux 0k×k
)−1(
1k
−qx
)
=
(
qx,x−1
µ
)
(B.37)
We are interested in solving for qx,x−1 as a function of qx. According to the formula
for the inverse of a block matrix, the upper right corner of the inverse of the matrix in
Equation (B.37) is
−
[(
DxXx−1DTx
)
◦ Fx
]−1
UT
{
U
[(
DxXx−1DTx
)
◦ Fx
]−1
UT
}−1
. (B.38)
Computationally, we may confirm that the sum of the row elements in the upper left
block matrix of the inverse of the matrix in Equation (B.37) is always zero, so we may
ignore the 1k in Equation (B.37). Thus, we conclude that, given qx, the agents in Ix will
optimally allocate the good to each link according to
qx,x−1 =
[(
DxXx−1DTx
)
◦ Fx
]−1
UT
{
U
[(
DxXx−1DTx
)
◦ Fx
]−1
UT
}−1
qx. (B.39)
The matrix in the RHS of Equation (B.39) is ATx.
Finally, having determined the allocation matrixAx, we will calculate the joint inverse
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demand of the agents in Ix. Substituting the value for A
T
x into Equation (B.31) yields
Φx(qx) = q
T
x1k
−
[(DxXx−1DTx) ◦ Fx]−1UT
{
U
[(
DxXx−1DTx
)
◦ Fx
]−1
UT
}−1
qx
T
[(
DxXx−1DTx
)
◦ Fx
][(
DxXx−1DTx
)
◦ Fx
]−1
UT
{
U
[(
DxXx−1DTx
)
◦ Fx
]−1
UT
}−1
qx, (B.40)
which reduces to
Φx(qx) = q
T
x1k − qTx
{
U
[(
DxXx−1DTx
)
◦ Fx
]−1
UT
}−1
qx. (B.41)
The assumption that intermediaries in Ix are willing to pay their marginal revenue for
the good yields
px =
dΦx(qx)
dqx
(B.42)
= 1k − 2
{
U
[(
DxXx−1DTx
)
◦ Fx
]−1
UT
}−1
qx. (B.43)
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Suppose that
pj + qij
∂pj
∂qj
6= pk + qik ∂pk
∂qk
, (B.44)
and W.L.O.G. assume that
pj + qij
∂pj
∂qj
> pk + qik
∂pk
∂qk
. (B.45)
Then, let
δ = pj + qij
∂pj
∂qj
−
(
pk + qik
∂pk
∂qk
)
. (B.46)
Now, suppose that i makes allocations q˜ij = qij +  and q˜ik = qik −  to intermediaries j
and k, respectively, where
0 <  <
δ∣∣∣∂pj∂qk − ∂pk∂qk ∣∣∣ . (B.47)
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Then the change in i’s profit will be

(
pj + 
∂pj
∂qj
)
+ qij
∂pj
∂qj
−
[

(
pk − ∂pk∂qk
)
+ qik
∂pk
∂qk
]
(B.48)
=
[
pj + qij
∂pj
∂qj
−
(
pk + qik
∂pk
∂qk
)]
+ 2
(
∂pj
∂qj
− ∂pk
∂qk
)
(B.49)
=δ + 2
(
∂pj
∂qj
− ∂pk
∂qk
)
(B.50)
=
[
δ + 
(
∂pj
∂qj
− ∂pk
∂qk
)]
. (B.51)
From Equation (B.47), the term in brackets must be positive, and i’s change in profit
from making allocations q˜ij and q˜ik must be positive, and i’s initial allocation may not be
an equilibrium allocation. Then we may reject Equation (B.44) and conclude that
pj + qij
∂pj
∂qj
= pk + qik
∂pk
∂qk
, (B.52)
for all j, k ∈ N−i (g).
Proof of Corollary 2.2. By the parameters of the model, all intermediaries pay a price
equal to their marginal revenue. From Proposition 2.3, marginal revenue is equal for i
along every out-link. Then, this must be i’s marginal revenue, and
pi = pj + qij
∂pj
∂qj
, (B.53)
for all j ∈ N−i (g).
Proof of Proposition 2.4. In the network gs(m, k), Ux = Dx = Ik ∀ x ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and
Fx =

1 1
2
· · · 1
2
1
2
1
...
...
. . . 1
2
1
2
· · · 1
2
1
 , (B.54)
∀ x ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Repeated applications of Proposition 2.2 yield
Xm =

2m 1 · · · 1
1 2m
...
...
. . . 1
1 · · · 1 2m
 . (B.55)
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Finally,
qt = 1
T
kX
−1
m 1k. (B.56)
This is
∑
i,j
Mij
det(X)
=
k
[
(2m − 1)k−2(2m + k − 2)
]
− k(k − 1)(2m − 1)k−2
(2m − 1)k−1(2m + k − 1) (B.57)
=
k
2m + k − 1 , (B.58)
where Mij is the (i, j)
th minor of Xm.
Proof of Proposition 2.5. First, we assert the following lemma; which, for the case of
complete networks, determines the recursive definition of the matrix Xx as a function of
Xx−1 when applying Proposition 2.2.
Lemma B.2 (Complete Stages). In network g, assume that tier x has k nodes and
tier x− 1 has ` nodes. As well, assume that d+i = ` ∀ i ∈ Ix and d−i = k ∀ i ∈ Ix−1. Then,
given Xx−1 such that
px−1 = 1` −Xx−1qx−1, (B.59)
we may define
Xx =
det (Xx−1)∑
i,j
Cij (Xx−1)
Sk (B.60)
such that
px = 1k −Xxqx, (B.61)
where Cij (X) is the ij
th cofactor of X and Sk is the k × k matrix defined
sij =
2 if i = j, and1 otherwise. (B.62)
Proof. Assume that tier x has k nodes and tier x− 1 has ` nodes, and that d+i = ` ∀ i ∈ Ix
and d−i = k ∀ i ∈ Ix−1. As well, assume that ∃Xx−1 such that
px−1 = 1` −Xx−1qx−1. (B.63)
By Proposition 2.2,
Xx = 2
[
Ux
(
DxXx−1DTx ◦ Fx
)−1
UTx
]−1
(B.64)
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and the matrices Dx, Ux, and Fx are as follows:
Dx =

I`
...
I`

× k, (B.65)
Ux =

1T` 0
T
` . . . 0
T
`
0T` 1
T
`
...
...
. . . 0T`
0T` . . . 0
T
` 1
T
`


× k, and (B.66)
Fx =

1`×` 121`×` . . .
1
2
1`×`
1
2
1`×` 1`×`
...
...
. . . 1
2
1`×`
1
2
1`×` . . . 121`×` 1`×`


× k. (B.67)
Then,
DxXx−1DTx ◦ Fx =

Xx−1 12Xx−1 . . .
1
2
Xx−1
1
2
Xx−1 Xx−1
...
...
. . . 1
2
Xx−1
1
2
Xx−1 . . . 12Xx−1 Xx−1


× k. (B.68)
Call this matrix X¯. Then,
X¯−1 = det(X¯)−1adj(X¯). (B.69)
Next,
UxX¯
−1UTx = Ux
(
det(X¯)−1adj(X¯)
)
UTx (B.70)
= det(X¯)−1Uxadj(X¯)UTx . (B.71)
Here, we will note that
Uxadj(X¯)U
T
x =
∑
i,j
Cij (Xx−1)

(−1)r+c 1
2
(−1)r+c . . . 1
2
(−1)r+c
1
2
(−1)r+c (−1)r+c ...
...
. . . 1
2
(−1)r+c
1
2
(−1)r+c . . . 1
2
(−1)r+c (−1)r+c


× k,
(B.72)
where r and c denote row and column indices, respectively. Denote the matrix in the
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above equation S¯. Then,(
Uxadj(X¯)U
T
x
)−1
=
1∑
i,j
Cij (Xx−1)
det(S¯)−1adj(S¯) (B.73)
=
1∑
i,j
Cij (Xx−1)
det(Sk)
−1Sk. (B.74)
This leaves us with
2
[
Ux
(
DxXx−1DTx ◦ Fx
)−1
UTx
]−1
=
det(X¯)
det(Sk)
∑
i,j
Cij (Xx−1)
Sk; (B.75)
however, because X¯ = Sk ⊗Xx−1,
det(X¯)
det(Sk)
= det(Xx), (B.76)
and
2
[
Ux
(
DxXx−1DTx ◦ Fx
)−1
UTx
]−1
=
det(Xx−1)∑
i,j
Cij (Xx−1)
Sk (B.77)
Because every tier in a complete network is a complete tier, Lemma B.2 can be used
at every tier. Conveniently,
det(Sk) = k + 1, (B.78)
and ∑
i,j
Cij (Sk) = k. (B.79)
Then,
Xm =
 ∏
k∈{1,...,m−1}
|Ik|+ 1
|Ik|
S|Im|. (B.80)
Finally,
qt = 1
T
|Im|X
−1
m 1|Im| (B.81)
=
∏
k∈{1,...,m}
|Ik|
|Ik + 1| . (B.82)
Proof of Proposition 2.6. The first derivative of Equation (2.62) is
(
k
k+1
)m(
(k + 2m − 1)log
(
k
k+1
)
+ 2m log 2
)
k
, (B.83)
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and the second derivative is(
k
k+1
)m(
(k + 2m − 1)log
(
k
k+1
)2
+ 2m+1 log(2) log
(
k
k+1
)
+ 2m log(2)2
)
k
. (B.84)
Both derivatives are greater than zero for all k ≥ 2 and m ≥ 2.

Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Please note that this proof requires Proposition 3.1, which is
proved later in this section.
This proof proceeds by induction. First we show that, when there are only 2 agents,
in any network structure there is always a Nash equilibrium. For the inductive step, we
select an arbitrary node k in any network and assume that there is at least one equilibrium
in the network g \ k. Assigning the actions from this equilibrium to the agents in N given
the network g, we determine k’s best-response actions. When k’s actions have no effect
on k’s neighbours, then this is an equilibrium. When k’s actions do effect his neighbours,
we show that a cascading sequence of best responses by all newly affected nodes must be
finite, ultimately ending in an equilibrium.
Base Case: Assume n = 2.
Let N = {i, j}. Then, there are four possible network structures, and we may
describe each possible set of links using the ordered pair g = (g1ij, g
2
ij). If g = (0, 0),
then the investments si = (sˆd, sˆd) and sj = (sˆd, sˆd) are an equilibrium. If g = (0, 1),
then the investments si = (sˆs, 0) and sj = (sˆd, sˆd) are an equilibrium. The case
where g = (1, 0) is symmetric to g = (0, 1), and therefore the investments si = (0, sˆs)
and sj = (sˆd, sˆd) are an equilibrium. Finally, if g = (1, 1), then the investments
si = (sˆs, 0) and sj = (0, sˆs) are an equilibrium.
We have demonstrated that a specialised equilibrium exists for all possible networks
with n = 2.
Inductive Step: Assume that for any n ∈ Z, n > 2, a specialised equilibrium exists
∀ |N | < n. We must show that for any network g with n agents, a specialised
equilibrium exists.
Begin with the network (N, g), with |N | = n, and select any arbitrary agent k.
Construct the reduced network, (N \ k, g), by removing k and any links connected
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to k. By our inductive assumption, there is a specialised equilibrium profile on the
network (N \ k, g). Let this profile be s∗.
Assign the actions in s∗ to the agents in N \ k. Then, N \ k may be partitioned into
four disjoint sets. Let D denote the set of dual-actors, with sd = (sˆd, sˆd) ∀ d ∈ D.
Let I1 denote the set of single-actors investing in layer g1, with si1 = (sˆs, 0)∀ i1 ∈ I1.
Let I2 denote the set of single-actors investing in layer g2, with si2 = (0, sˆs)∀ i2 ∈ I2.
Finally, let L denote the set free-riders, with s` = (0, 0) ∀ ` ∈ L.
Next, we will consider all the potential sets of neighbours that k may have in (N, g),
and the actions that k will take assuming all neighbours are taking actions s∗. There
are four simple cases where k’s actions do not require any other agents to deviate
from s∗, which are described below.
Case 1: ∃ i1 ∈ I1 such that i1 ∈ Nk(g1) and ∃ i2 ∈ I2 such that i2 ∈ Nk(g2)
When k is linked to at least one single-investor in each layer, k’s best response
is to make investment sk = (0, 0). This will not change the local investment
for any agent in N \ k in either layer, and the action set s∗ ∪ sk is a specialised
equilibrium on the network (N, g).
Case 2: ∃ i ∈ I1 ∪D such that i ∈ Nk(g1) and ∀ j ∈ Nk(g2), j ∈ L ∪ I1
In this case, k is linked to at least one investor in layer g1, and k is only linked
to non-investors in g2. k’s best response is to make investment sk = (0, sˆs).
When k does so, the local investment of all of k’s neighbours in g1 will remain
unchanged, and their actions described by s∗ will remain optimal when links
are added to k. When k makes the investment sk, the local investment of all
of k’s neighbours in g2 will increase. Because all of k’s neighbours in g2 are
non-investors in g2 in s∗, an increase in their local investments will ensure that
non-investing remains optimal. Thus, the action set s∗ ∪ sk is a specialised
equilibrium on the network (N, g).
Case 3: ∃ i ∈ I2 ∪D such that i ∈ Nk(g2) and ∀ j ∈ Nk(g1), j ∈ L ∪ I2
This case is symmetric to Case 2 with layers g1 and g2 reversed, and follows
accordingly.
Case 4: ∀ i ∈ Nk(g1), i ∈ L ∪ I2 and ∀ j ∈ Nk(g2), j ∈ L ∪ I1
Here, k is linked only with non-investors in each layer. k therefore has no
local investment in either layer, and k’s optimal investment is sk = (sˆd, sˆd).
This action will increase the local investment for all of k’s neighbours in both
layers. Because all of k’s neighbours were non-investors in s∗, after increasing
local investment non-investing will remain optimal. Therefore, the action set
s∗ ∪ sk is a specialised equilibrium on the network (N, g).
If none of Cases 1–4 hold, then it must be true that: after k employs his best
response to all of the agents in N \ k employing strategy s∗, there is at least one
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agent in N \ k who will deviate from s∗ in response to k’s action. This occurs when
k is linked to one (or more) dual-actors in a layer, but no single actors, and k’s
local investment in this layer is insufficient to support non-investment. After an
investment by k, these neighbouring dual-actors must respond by reducing their
own investments. This scenario may concurrently occur in both layers, for instance
if k is linked to one dual-actor in each layer. Without loss of generality, we will
proceed by assuming that this occurs in layer g1 and that when all agents in N \ k
employ strategy s∗, s¯1k ≤ s¯2k.
We assume that k makes the investment sk = (sˆs, 0). Then, alter the strategies
employed by all agents according to the following sequence:
1. Assign the strategy s∗ ∪ sk to all agents in N .
2. The only set of agents, excluding k, for whom their currently strategy is not
optimal is the set of dual-actors who are linked to k in layer g1. Assume that all
of these agents change their action to (0, sˆs), so that they are now single-actors
in layer g2. This will change the subsets of N in the following way, where the
subscript ‘old’ denotes the subsets prior to this step: I2 = I2old ∪ (Dold ∩Nk(g1))
and D = Dold \ (Dold ∩Nk(g1)).
3. (a) There may be free-riders who are unconnected to any single-actors in g1
and who now have insufficient local investment to support free-riding in g1
(because at least one dual-actor to whom they are linked in g1 became a
single-actor in layer g2 in step 2). If any such free-riders exist, take the set
L′ to be a maximal independent set of these free-riders in g1. Then, assign
the action s`′ = (sˆs, 0) to all agents in L
′, which results in the following
two new sets: I1 = I1old ∪ L′ and L = Lold \ L′.
(b) If L′ is non-empty in step 3a, meaning there are agents switching from the
set L to the set I1, then this may cause further agents to need to change
their action. Such agents could only be dual-actors who were linked to
agents in L′ in layer g1, who now find themselves linked to single-actors. If
any such-dual actors exist, let them compose the set D′, and assign them
the action sd′ = (0, sˆs), so that they are now members of I
2. The change
in sets is I2 = I2old ∪D′ and D = Dold \D′.
(c) If a non-empty set of dual-actors become single-actors in g2 in step 3b, then
this may force additional free-riders who are connected to these agents in
layer g1 to begin investing. This mirrors the change that occurs in step 3a.
If we continue to repeat steps 3a and 3b, then we will alternate between
moving agents from L to I1 and moving agents from D to I2. Because L is
finite, this sequence of repeated action changes must eventually terminate.
4. After step 2 and repeated applications of steps 3a and 3b, the change may be
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summarised: a subset of L have switched to I1 and a subset of D have switched
to I2. The new members of I1 will have no further effects on other members
of the network: they cannot have links to other agents in I1 or else they would
not have switched in the first place. When agents move from D to I2, however,
they may affect additional agents. This would only be previous members of I2
who are now connected only to non-investors in g1. If there are no such agents,
the current action profile is a specialised equilbrium. Otherwise, let I2
′
be a
maximal independent set of these agents in g1, and assign all members of I2
′
the new action si2′ = (sˆd, sˆd). We now have the new sets D = Dold ∪ I2′ and
I2 = I2old \ I2′.
5. (a) The change in step 4 will only affect one new set of agents: some free-
riders may no longer have sufficient local investment in g2. If there are
no such free-riders the proof is complete; otherwise let L′ be a maximal
independent subset of these free-riders in g2. Change the action for all of
the agents in L to make them single-actors in g2. The new subsets are
I2 = I2old ∪ L′ and L = Lold \ L′.
(b) As in step 3b, step 5a may require dual-actors to switch to single-action
in layer g1.
(c) As in step 3c, steps 5a and 5b must terminate after a finite sequence of
repetitions. At this point, a subset of agents in L will have switched to I2,
and a subset of agents in D will have switched to I1.
6. After steps 5a–5c, we have a symmetric scenario to that preceding step 4. If
there are any members of I1 who are no longer linked to any investors in g2,
we move them to D by changing their action to dual-action. If there are no
such agents, the current action profile must be a specialised Nash equilibrium.
7. After step 6, the scenario is symmetric to that preceding steps 5a–5c. We have
either reached a symmetric Nash equilibrium, or a subset of agents will have
to be moved from set L to set I1 and a subset of agents may have to be moved
from set D to set I2.
8. At this point, step 4 repeats. Either we have a specialised equilibrium, or there
are members of set I2 who must be moved to set D.
If a repeated loop of steps 4–7 ever terminates, it must do so in a specialised Nash
equilibrium. Now, note that steps 5a and 7 require that agents be moved from
set L into another set; otherwise the algorithm will terminate. Because agents are
never moved into set L, and set L must be finite to begin with, this algorithm must
eventually terminate.
Therefore, a specialised equilibrium must exist with n+ 1 agents, and the inductive
step is complete.
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Proof of Proposition 3.1. Proposition 3.1 summarises a series of lemmas that govern how
an individual agent in an equilibrium must act. The first ensures that any agent has a
unique optimal investment, given the investment decisions of all other agents.
Lemma C.1. Given the investment decisions of all other agents, s−i, an agent i has a
unique profit maximising investment si.
Proof. The Hessian matrix of Πi(s | g) at si is
H =
[
f ′′(s1i ) −β
−β f ′′(s2i )
]
(C.1)
By assumption, f ′′(x) < 0 ∀ x ∈ R+, so the first leading principal minor ofH is always
negative. The second leading principal minor of H is f ′′(s1i )f
′′(s2i )− β2. Assumption 3.1
tells us that f ′′(s1i )f
′′(s2i ) > β
2 ∀ si ∈ S˜, which implies that the second leading principal
minor is positive ∀ si ∈ S˜. Because all odd leading principal minors are always negative
on S˜, and all even leading principal minors are always positive on S˜, then H is negative
definite ∀ si ∈ S˜, which in turn implies that Πi(s | g) is concave on S˜. By construction,
S˜ is compact. A concave function on a compact set must have a unique maximum.
Next we consider an agent’s actions when it is optimal for an agent to invest in a single
layer.
Lemma C.2. In Nash equilibrium, if an agent is a single-actor, then they will always
invest in a layer gp where
p = arg min
x
s¯ix. (C.2)
Proof. Assume that agent i must be a single-actor, and that i is choosing between invest-
ment in layer g1 or layer g2. Assume that s¯pi ≤ s¯qi . As well, since investment will not be
profitable in gq when s¯qi ≥ sˆs, assume also that s¯qi < sˆs.
The return that i generates in either layer gm in excess of making no investment is
f(sˆs)− f(s¯mi )− c(sˆs − s¯mi ). (C.3)
Then, the difference between an investment in gp and an investment in gq is
f(sˆs)− f
(
s¯pi
)− c (sˆs − s¯pi )− [f(sˆs)− f (s¯qi )− c (sˆs − s¯qi )] (C.4)
=f
(
s¯qi
)− f (s¯pi )− c (s¯qi − s¯pi ) (C.5)
Because f ′′(·) < 0 and f ′(sˆs) = c, f ′(x) > c ∀ x ∈ [0, sˆs]. Then, given that s¯pi ≤ s¯qi < sˆs,
it must also follow that f
(
s¯qi
)− f (s¯pi ) > c (s¯qi − s¯pi ) when s¯pi 6= s¯qi , which would establish
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that difference between investing in gp and gq must be positive. A utility maximising
single-actor will, therefore, always invest in a layer with minimal local effort.
We may determine precisely when investment in a single layer will be optimal for any
agent, and also what investment must be in this scenario.
Lemma C.3. Let s∗ be an equilibrium in the network (N, g). Assume that there exists
an agent i for whom s¯pi < s¯
q
i and s¯
p
i < sˆs. Then i is a single-actor making investment
spi
∗ = sˆs − spi in layer gp if and only if
spi
∗ ≥ f
′(s¯qi )− c
β
. (C.6)
Proof. Let s¯pi ≤ s¯qi , and assume that agent i is investing in only one layer. By Lemma C.2,
we know that this must be layer gp. Then i’s investment is si = {spi , 0}.
Suppose i is making investment spi 6= sˆs − s¯pi in layer gp. Then i’s marginal payoff in
layer gp, is
f ′(spi + s¯
p
i )− c 6= f ′(sˆs − s¯pi + s¯pi )− c (C.7)
= f ′(sˆs)− c (C.8)
= 0 (C.9)
Because i’s marginal payoff in layer gp is not zero, i may improve his payoff by changing his
investment, and i cannot be making an equilibrium investment. Thus, we may conclude
that spi = sˆs − s¯pi .
Now, given spi = sˆs − s¯pi and sqi = 0, i’s marginal payoff from investment in layer gq is
f ′(s¯qi )− β(sˆs − s¯pi )− c. i may only invest zero in layer gq if i’s marginal payoff is weakly
negative, that is
f ′(s¯qi )− β(sˆs − s¯pi )− c ≤ 0 (C.10)
sˆs − s¯pi ≥
f ′(s¯qi )− c
β
(C.11)
In the case where local investment for an agent is equal in both layers, then any
investing agent must invest equally in both layers.
Lemma C.4. Let s∗ be an equilibrium in the network (N, g). For any agent i whose local
investment is equal in both layers and less than sˆs, that is s¯
1
i = s¯
2
i < sˆs, i must be making
investment si = (s˜i, s˜i), where f
′(s˜i + s¯1i )− βs˜i − c = 0.
Proof. Because s¯1i = s¯
2
i , Equations (3.3) and (3.4) are equivalent, and a solution to one is
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a solution to both. Recall Equation (3.3):
f ′(s1i + s¯
1
i )− βs1i − c ≤ 0 (C.12)
Because s¯1i < sˆs,
f ′(0 + s¯1i )− β0− c = f ′
(
s¯1i − c
)
(C.13)
> f ′(sˆs)− c (C.14)
> 0, (C.15)
and because the left side of Equation (C.12) is continuous and decreasing in s˜i1, there
must be some s˜i > 0 for which f
′(s˜i + s¯1i )− βs˜i − c = 0.
By the construction of S˜, any solution to Equation (C.12) may not exceed the up-
per boundary of S˜. Then si = (s˜i, s˜i) ∈ S˜ is a solution to Equations (3.3) and (3.4).
Lemma C.1 ensures that this is the unique solution to agent i’s maximisation problem.
The following corollary is a direct result of Lemma C.4.
Corollary C.1. Let s∗ ∈ Sn be an equilibrium of the network (N, g). If there exists an
agent i who has no local investment in either layer, then i must be a dual-actor making
investment s∗i = (sˆd, sˆd), where sˆd is the solution to the equation f
′(sˆd)− βsˆd − c = 0.
Proof. From Lemma C.4, we may state that, ∀ x ∈ [0, sˆs), Equations (3.3) and (3.4) will
have a unique symmetric solution: s∗i = (s˜i, s˜i), if s¯
1
i = s¯
2
i = x. Setting s¯
1
i = s¯
2
i = 0, we
find that s∗i = (sˆd, sˆd), where sˆd is the solution to the equation f
′(sˆd)− βsˆd − c = 0.
Lemmas C.1 to C.4 and Corollary C.1 provide sufficient support for all of the claims
in Proposition 3.1.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. The payoff of a dual-actor in a specialist equilibrium is
Πd(s
∗ | g) = 2f(sˆd)− 2csˆd − β (sˆd)2. As well, since a free-rider receives payoff of at least
f(sˆs) from each layer, the payoff to a free-rider must satisfy Π`(s
∗ | g) ≥ 2f(sˆs). Then,
Π`(s
∗ | g) ≥ 2f(sˆs) > 2f(sˆd)− 2csˆd − β (sˆd)2 = Πd(s∗ | g), and free-riders are always
better off than dual-actors in specialised equilibria.
The payoff that a single-actor receives in the layer in which they are investing is
f(sˆs)− csˆs. In the other layer, a single-actor must be connected to at least one investing
node, otherwise the single-actor would switch to dual-action. Thus, the payoff to a single-
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actor must satisfy
Πi(s
∗ | g) ≥ [f(sˆs)− csˆs]+ f(sˆd) (C.16)
> f(sˆd)− csˆd + f(sˆd) (C.17)
> 2f(sˆd)− 2csˆd − β (sˆd)2 (C.18)
= Πd(s
∗ | g) (C.19)
and the payoff of a single-actor must be greater than the payoff of a dual-actor. Step
C.17 is based on the fact that sˆs is the optimal investment amount for a single-actor, so
f(sˆs)− csˆs > f(sˆd)− csˆd, with a strict inequality because f is strictly concave and thus
sˆs is unique.
Thus, all dual-actors will receive payoff less than that of a single-actor or a free-rider.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. First, we will prove that if N can be partitioned into the four
disjoint sets, L, I1, I2, and D, as defined in Theorem 3.2, and that the agents take the
action profile s such that s` = (0, 0) ∀ ` ∈ L, si1 = (sˆs, 0) ∀ i1 ∈ I1, si2 = (0, sˆs) ∀ i2 ∈ I2,
and sd = (sˆd, sˆd) ∀ d ∈ D, then this is a stable equilibrium.
Let k be the maximum degree of any agent in either g1 or g2.
Note that, because f ′(sˆd)− βsˆd − c = 0, we know that f ′(sˆd)− βsˆs − c < 0. As well,
f ′(0)− βsˆs − c > 0; otherwise single-action could be a local maximum in autarky, which
would violate Lemma C.1. Because f ′(sˆd − x)− β(sˆs − x)− c is continuous and increas-
ing in x, there must then be some x ∈ (0, sˆd) such that f ′(sˆd − x)− β(sˆs − x)− c = 0.
Following similar logic, because f ′(sˆd)− βsˆs − c < 0 and f ′(0)− βsˆs − c > 0, there is
some y ∈ (0, sˆd) such that f ′(y)− βsˆs − c = 0. And finally, let z = sˆd − y.
Let δ =
⌊
sˆs
sˆd
+ 1
⌋
, so δ is the minimum number of dual-actors that a free-rider who is
not connected to any single-actor must be connected to, according to 2a. Assume that
ρ < min
{
sˆd
k
,
δsˆd − sˆs
δk
,
x
k
,
y
k
,
z
k
}
(C.20)
. Let  be any n× 2 vector such that |pi | < ρ and spi + pi ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ N , p ∈ {1, 2}.
Given a sequence of best responses to starting vector s, let rp,ti (s | g) denote i’s invest-
ment in layer p in the tth element of the sequence.
Step 1 : Consider r1(s+  | g).
In layer gp, for any ` ∈ L, if condition 2a holds, then ` is connected to at least δ
agents in D. After a permutation of s by , each agent’s investment may be reduced
C.1. PROOFS 83
by at most ρ. Thus, after such a permutation,
s¯p` ≥ δsˆd − kρ (C.21)
> δsˆd − kδsˆd − sˆs
δk
(C.22)
> δsˆd − kδsˆd − sˆs
k
(C.23)
= sˆs. (C.24)
Agent ` will therefore make no investment in the first step after a permutation by
.
Alternatively, suppose that 2b holds, and ` is connected to at least one agent in Ip
and more than one agent in D ∪ Ip. Then after a permutation of s by , `’s local
investment will be such that
s¯p` ≥ sˆs + sˆd − kρ (C.25)
> sˆs + sˆd − k sˆd
k
(C.26)
= sˆs. (C.27)
Again, agent ` will make no investment in the first step after a permutation by .
We may thus conclude that r1` (s+  | g) = (0, 0).
In layer g1, any i2 ∈ I2 is connected to at least one agent in D ∪ I1. After a per-
mutation of s by , it is then the case that s¯1i2 ≥ sˆd − kρ. In layer g2, i2 will have
previously had no investment of effort by neighbours, and thus permutation by 
results in s¯2i2 ≤ kρ. This, in turn, implies that i2’s optimal single-action investment
in g2 is weakly greater than sˆs − kρ. Then, i2’s marginal payoff from investment in
g1 would be
∂Πi2(s+  | g)
∂s1i2
≤ f ′(sˆd − kρ)− β(sˆs − kρ)− c (C.28)
< f ′(sˆd − kx
k
)− β(sˆs − kx
k
)− c (C.29)
= f ′(sˆd − x)− β(sˆs − x)− c (C.30)
= 0 (C.31)
By Lemma C.3, we may then conclude that in the first step after permutation by
, any agent i2 will be a single-actor investing in layer g2, and that i2’s investment
in g2 will be at least sˆs − kρ. That is, r1i2(s+  | g) = (0, s˜i2), where s˜i2 ∈ [sˆs − k, sˆ]
may vary for each member of I2.
By symmetry, we may conclude as well that r1i1(s+  | g) = (s˜i1 , 0), where
s˜i1 ∈ [sˆs − k, sˆ] may vary for each member of I1.
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In layer g1, any d ∈ D has no neighbours in D ∪ I1. After a permutation of s by ,
we know that s¯pd ∈ [0, kρ]. We wish to consider whether it is possible for d to switch
to single action. Suppose that d were to become a single-actor in layer gp. Then,
∂Πd(s+  | g)
∂s1d
≥ f ′(kρ)− βsˆs − c (C.32)
> f ′(k
y
k
)− βsˆs − c (C.33)
= f ′(y)− βsˆs − c (C.34)
= 0. (C.35)
By Lemma C.3, d cannot be a single-actor, and must invest in both layers after a
permutation of s by . If d reduces investment in layer gp, then marginal payoff
increases in layer gq, which would incentivise d to increase investment in layer gq.
Thus, sˆd − kρ represents the minimal amount that d could invest in either layer,
and we may write that r1d(s+  | g) = (s˜1d, s˜2d), where s˜1d, s˜2d ∈ [sˆd − kρ, sˆd] and both
values may vary for each member of D.
We will next consider what investment any agent will make after two steps of myopic
best responses to the permutation .
Step 2 : Consider r2(s+ |g).
In Step 1, we showed that all free-riders, any agents ` ∈ L, will make no investment,
and single-actors will not invest in the layer in which they were not investing initially.
Since dual-actors may only have connections to these two types of agents, we can
conclude that after the first step, s¯pd = 0 ∀ p ∈ {1, 2}. Thus, we conclude that dual-
agents will return to their original investments in the second step of myopic best
responses, that is r2d(s+  | g) = (sˆd, sˆd).
Consider any i1 ∈ I1. In g1, i1 may only be connected to agents in L and I2. Since
none of these agents will invest in layer g1 in step 1, in step 2 s¯i11 = 0, and i
1’s
optimal single-action investment in g1 is sˆs. Now, suppose that i
1 does make this
investment. i1 is connected to at least one member of D ∪ I2 in g2, and therefore
s¯2i1 ≤ sˆd − kρ. i1’s marginal payoff in g2 is
∂Πi1(sStep1 | g)
∂s2i1
≤ f ′(sˆd − kρ)− βsˆs − c (C.36)
< f ′(sˆd − k z
k
)− βsˆs − c (C.37)
= f ′(y)− βsˆs − c (C.38)
= 0. (C.39)
Thus, r2i1(s+  | g) = (sˆs, 0) satisfies agent i’s first order conditions, and by
Lemma C.1, we may conclude that any agent i1 ∈ I1 will make this investment.
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By symmetry, we conclude as well that r2i2(s+  | g) = (0, sˆs).
Finally, consider any agent ` ∈ L. If 2b holds, then ` will be connected to at least
one investing single-actor and at least one dual-actor in either layer gp. Then
s¯p` ≥ (sˆs − kρ) + (sˆd − kρ) (C.40)
> sˆs − sˆd − 2k sˆd
k
(C.41)
= sˆs + sˆd (C.42)
> sˆs. (C.43)
So ` will not invest in either layer.
Now, consider the case when 2a holds, then ` is connected to at least δ dual-actors
in either layer gp. In this case,
s¯p` ≥ δ(sˆd − kρ) (C.44)
> δsˆd − δkδsˆd − sˆs
δk
(C.45)
= sˆs. (C.46)
Thus, ` will not invest in either layer. We may then conclude that
r2` (s+  | g) = (0, 0).
Thus, we have shown that all agents will return to their original investments after
a permutation of s by  and two steps of myopic best responses.
Now, we will prove the opposite direction, that an equilibrium that is stable must be
characterised as set out in Theorem 3.2. This requires the following lemma.
Lemma C.5. Let s, s′ ∈ S be two distinct action profiles such that ∀ i ∈ N s1i ≥ s1i ′, and
s2i ≤ s2i ′. Then, ∀ i ∈ N , r1,2i (s | g) ≥ r1,2i (s′ | g) and r2,2i (s | g) ≤ r2,2i (s′ | g).
As this lemma is notationally dense, we will state it in words. Given the two action
profiles s, s′ ∈ S, if the actions of all agents in layer g1 are weakly greater in s than in
s′, and the actions of all agents in layer g2 are weakly greater in s′ than in s, then after
two steps of simultaneous myopic best responses by all agents the same relationships will
hold.
Proof of Lemma C.5. Let s, s′ ∈ S be two separate action profiles such that ∀ i ∈ N ,
s1i ≥ s1i ′ and s2i ≤ s2i ′.
Pick any arbitrary agent i ∈ N , and suppose that r1i (s) = (sˆs − s¯1i , 0). Then we know
that f ′(s¯2i )− β(sˆs − s¯1i )− c ≤ 0 by Lemma C.3. But then
f ′
(
s¯2i
′)− β (sˆ′s − s¯1i ′)− c ≤ f ′ (s¯2i )− β (sˆs − s¯1i )− c (C.47)
≤ 0, (C.48)
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so r1i (s
′) =
(
sˆ′s − s¯1i ′, 0
)
, and because s¯1i
′ ≤ s¯1i ′, i’s investment in g1 in r1i (s′) must be
weakly larger than i’s investment in r1i (s), and thus r
1,1
i (s) ≤ r1,1i (s′) and r2,1i (s) ≥ r2,1i (s′).
By a similar argument, it can be shown that if r1i (s
′) =
(
0, sˆs − s¯2i ′
)
, then it must be
the case that r1i (s) = (0, sˆs − s¯2i ), and so r1,1i (s) ≤ r1,1i (s′) and r2,1i (s) ≥ r2,1i (s′).
Because a single-actor will always have a greater marginal payoff function in the
layer of investment than a dual-actor, if r1i (s
′) =
(
sˆ′s − s¯1i ′, 0
)
and r1i (s) involves dual-
investment, or if r1i (s) = (0, sˆs − s¯2i ) and r1i (s′) involves dual-investment, then the rela-
tionships r1,1i (s) ≤ r1,1i (s′) and r2,1i (s) ≥ r2,1i (s′) must hold.
Suppose that ri(s) = (0, sˆs − s¯2i ) and ri(s′) = (sˆs − s¯1i ′, 0). Then clearly
r1,1i (s) ≤ r1,1i (s′) and r2,1i (s) ≥ r2,1i (s′).
We have now shown for all boundary solutions that r1,1i (s) ≤ r1,1i (s′) and
r2,1i (s) ≥ r2,1i (s′), which leaves only the case when both r1i (s) and r1i (s′) involve
dual-investment.
We know that the system
f ′(x¯+ x)− βy − c = 0 and (C.49)
f ′(y¯ + y)− βx− c = 0 (C.50)
is unique, due to Lemma C.1. Now we consider what happens to the solution when x¯
changes and y¯ remains constant. From Equation (C.50),
f ′′(y¯ + y) dy − β dx = 0 (C.51)
dy =
β
f ′′(y¯ + y)
dx. (C.52)
Then plug this into the total derivative of Equation (C.49)
f ′′(x¯+ x)(dx¯+ dx)− β β
f ′′(y¯ + y)
dx = 0 (C.53)
f ′′(x¯+ x)
(
1 +
dx
dx¯
)
− β
2
f ′′(y¯ + y)
dx
dx¯
= 0 (C.54)
dx
dx¯
=
−f ′′(x¯+ x)f ′′(y¯ + y)
f ′′(x¯+ x)f ′′(y¯ + y)− β2 . (C.55)
Because of Assumption 3.1, we know that the denominator of Equation (C.55) is positive,
while the numerator is negative. Thus, we may conclude that, at the unique solution,
dx
dx¯
< 0, which in turn implies that dy
dx¯
> 0, from Equation (C.52). If x¯ increases and y¯
decreases, sequential application of this conclusion ensures that the optimal value of x
will decrease and the optimal value of y will increase.
We know that s¯1i ≥ s¯1i ′ and s¯2i ≤ s¯2i ′ ∀ i ∈ N . If both r1i (s) and r1i (s′) involve dual-
investment, then from Equations (C.52) and (C.55) we may conclude that r1,1i (s) ≤ r1,1i (s′)
and r2,1i (s) ≥ r2,1i (s′), and we can therefore conclude that these two relationships always
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hold.
But then, by applying this fact twice, it must be true that a second step of best-
response function r yields r1,2i (s) ≥ r1,2i (s′) and r2,2i (s) ≤ r2,2i (s′) ∀ i ∈ N , which proves
this lemma.
Now, suppose that s∗ ∈ S is a stable equilibrium, and suppose there exists an investor
i such that s¯1i ≤ s¯2i < sˆs, and sˆs − s¯1i < f
′(s¯2i )−c
β
. Proposition 3.1 tells us that i will be
making an interior investment in both layers. Let i’s investment be si = (s
1
i , s
2
i ). Because
i’s investment is interior, there must be some δ > 0 such that s˜i = (s
1
i + δ, s
2
i ) ∈ S˜. Now,
suppose s∗ is permuted such that i now invests s˜i and no other agent changes their
investment. By Lemma C.5, in every second iteration of the best response function, i’s
investment in g1 is greater than s1i + δ. Therefore, a sequence of best responses to this
permutation will not converge to s∗. Thus, there can be no agent i making an interior
investment in both layers.
Now, suppose there exists an investor i such that s¯1i ≤ s¯2i < sˆs, and sˆs − s¯1i ≥ f
′(s¯2i )−c
β
.
Proposition 3.1 tells us that i will be making an investment only in layer g1. Let i’s invest-
ment be si = (s
1
i , 0), with s
1
i < sˆs. Then, there must be some δ > 0 such that s
1
i + δ < sˆs.
Now, suppose s∗ is permuted such that i now invests makes investment (s1i + δ, 0) and no
other agent changes their investment. By Lemma C.5, in every second iteration of the
best response function, i’s investment in g1 is greater than s1i + δ. Therefore, a sequence
of best responses to this permutation will not converge to s∗. Thus, there can be no agent
i making investment si.
We have shown that there may be no interior investors in a stable equilibrium, leav-
ing only specialists investing (0, 0), (sˆs, 0), (0, sˆs), or (sˆd, sˆd). According to the criteria
established in Proposition 3.1, such investments will only be best responses when the set
of all agents may be partitioned into the sets L, I1, I2, and D.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. I have claimed that the function
φ(s) =
(
α11
α21
)T
s− 1
2
sT
I − [δ1G1 βI
βI δ2G2
] s (C.56)
satisfies the properties of a potential function. That is, ∀ si, s′i and ∀ i ∈ N ,
φ(si, s−i)− φ
(
s′i, s−i
)
= Πi(si, s−i | g)− Πi
(
s′i, s−i | g
)
. (C.57)
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Then, ∀ s, s′ ∈ S such that for any i ∈ N , si 6= s′i implies sj = s′j ∀ j 6= i,
φ(si, s−i)− φ
(
s′i, s−i
)
(C.58)
=φ(s)− φ (s′) (C.59)
=
(
α11
α21
)T
s− 1
2
sT
I − [δ1G1 βI
βI δ2G2
] s
−
(
α11
α21
)T
s′ − 1
2
s′T
I − [δ1G1 βI
βI δ2G2
] s′
(C.60)
=
∑
j∈N
[
α1s1j + α
2s2j −
1
2
((
s1j
)2
+
(
s2j
)2)
+ βs1js
2
j
]
+
1
2
∑
j∈N
∑
k∈N
(δ1g1jks
1
js
1
k + δ
2g2jks
2
js
2
k)

−
∑
j∈N
[
α1s1j
′
+ α2s2j
′ − 1
2
((
s1j
′)2
+
(
s2j
′)2)
+ βs1j
′
s2j
′
]
+
1
2
∑
j∈N
∑
k∈N
(δ1g1jks
1
j
′
s1k
′
+ δ2g2jks
2
j
′
s2k
′
)

(C.61)
= α1s1i + α
2s2i −
1
2
((
s1i
)2
+
(
s2i
)2)
+ βs1i s
2
i + δ
1s1i
∑
j∈N
g1ijs
1
j + δ
2s2i
∑
j∈N
g2ijs
2
j
−
[
α1s1i
′
+ α2s2i
′ − 1
2
((
s1i
′)2
+
(
s2i
′)2)
+ βs1i
′
s2i
′
+ δ1s1i
′∑
j∈N
g1ijs
1
j
′
+ δ2s2i
′∑
j∈N
g2ijs
2
j
′

(C.62)
=Πi(si, s−i | g)− Πi
(
s′i, s−i | g
)
(C.63)
Thus, φ satisfies the properties of a potential function.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Let
υp =
δ
pλmax(G
p) if δp > 0
δpλmin(G
p) if δp < 0.
(C.64)
If
β2 < (1− υ1)(1− υ2), (C.65)
then the game Γ(N,S, g) has a unique equilibrium on the action space S.
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From Proposition 3.3, we know that the potential function for the game Γ(N,S, g) is
φ(s) =
(
α11
α21
)T
s− 1
2
sT
I − [δ1G1 βI
βI δ2G2
] s. (C.66)
Then,
∂φ(s)
∂s
=
(
α11
α21
)
−
I − [δ1G1 βI
βI δ2G2
] s (C.67)
and
∇φ(s) = −
I − [δ1G1 βI
βI δ2G2
]. (C.68)
To prove that φ(s) has a unique global maximum on S, it is sufficient to show that −∇φ(s)
is positive definite on S. First, let
M = −∇φ(s) =
[
I − δ1G1 −βI
−βI I − δ2G2
]
. (C.69)
M is positive definite if and only if its upper left block and the Schur
complement if its upper left block are positive definite. These are (I − δ1G1) and
(I − δ2G2)− β2(I − δ1G1)−1 respectively.
Recall that
υp =
δ
pλmax(G
p) if δp > 0
δpλmin(G
p) if δp < 0.
. (C.70)
Thus, −υ1 is the minimum eigenvalue of −δ1G1, which requires the fact that the minimum
eigenvalue of an adjacency matrix is less than or equal to 0. It follows, then, that 1− υ1 is
the minimum eigenvalue of (I − δ1G1). We may thus conclude that (I − δ1G1) is positive
definite if and only if 1− υ1 > 0.
Consider now the Schur complement, (I − δ2G2)− β2(I − δ1G1)−1. By Weyl’s in-
equality,
λmin
[
(I − δ2G2)− β2(I − δ1G1)−1] (C.71)
≥λmin(I − δ2G2) + λmin(−β2(I − δ1G1)−1) (C.72)
=(1− υ2)− β
2
1− υ1 . (C.73)
Now, we have assumed
β2 < (1− υ1)(1− υ2) (C.74)
⇐⇒ (1− υ2)− β
2
1− υ1 > 0, (C.75)
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which is sufficient to show that the minimum eigenvalue of the Schur complement is
greater than zero, and thus the Schur complement is positive definite.
Thus, the assumptions that 1− υ1 > 0 and β2 < (1− υ1)(1− υ2) are sufficient to
ensure that there is a unique equilibrium.
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